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ABSTRACT 
 
In a recent concept release the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) highlighted 
concerns regarding auditor independence and auditor objectivity. They expressed concern that 
auditors may have a bias to accept management’s views, particularly in long auditor tenure relations, 
and asked for public comments on the idea of mandatory auditor rotation. Prior research has focused 
primarily on the auditor side of the relation, however, my study considers the collaborative effect of 
the three parties involved in the financial reporting process (management (Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO), the auditor, and the audit committee).I find that longer collaborative tenure between the 
CEO and the auditor is associated with lower positive discretionary accruals (i.e., less earnings 
management). This finding is contrary to the PCAOB’s concerns regarding long auditor tenure and 
lower financial reporting quality. I do not find that the joint tenure of the three parties (CEO, auditor 
and audit committee chair) is significantly associated with earnings management or accrual quality. 
I also find that the first year of an audit committee chair change is associated with an increase in 
positive discretionary accruals. This association does not differ based on different lengths of auditor 
tenure. However, longer collaborative tenure between the auditor and the CEO constrains earnings 
management and there is an even greater effect when there is an audit committee chair change (i.e., 
there are lower positive discretionary accruals). This study provides evidence that longer auditor 
tenure is not necessarily an undesirable situation, either by itself and particularly not if the long 
tenure is coupled with long tenure of the CEO. 
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I. Introduction 
In an August 2011 concept release, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB) highlighted concerns over a lack of objectivity and professional skepticism by the auditor, 
leading to deficiencies in the audit process and audit opinions that are not supported by sufficient 
evidence (PCAOB 2011). The release included observations from their inspections that “the audit 
partners and senior managers [of the inspected firm] may have a bias toward accepting 
management's perspective, rather than developing an independent view or challenging 
management's conclusions.” The PCAOB discussed the importance of auditor independence and 
sought public comments on the idea of mandatory audit firm rotation, particularly for firms with 
auditor tenure relationships greater than 10 years. Comments were accepted the next four months, 
with approximately 90 percent of the responders opposed to the idea (Johnson 2012). Furthermore, 
Congressman Mike Fitzpatrick (R-PA) introduced an amendment to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 that would prohibit the PCAOB from requiring issuers to use specific auditors or for the 
rotation of auditors.1 It remains to be seen what will come of these discussions regarding mandatory 
rotation as the PCAOB continues to gather more data and study the issue further.  
Mandatory auditor rotation has been considered by Congress and regulators several times in 
the last 35 years as a potential solution over concerns of a lack of auditor independence, particularly 
when there is a lengthy relationship between the auditor and client (Metcalf Report 1977)2. Some of 
the frequently cited benefits of mandatory rotation are a “fresh viewpoint” or more incentive to 
resist pressure by management (PCAOB 2011). Ultimately the conclusion reached each time was 
that the costs of mandatory auditor rotation were believed to outweigh the benefits (AICPA 1978; 
SEC 1994).  In addition, prior academic research with U.S. data has generally not supported the 
                                                 
1
 Amendment available at:  http://financialservices.house.gov/UploadedFiles/BILLS-112hr-PIH-PCAOBdd.pdf 
2
 See also PCAOB (2011) for further details on various times mandatory audit firm rotation has been evaluated. 
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notion that long tenure is associated with negative financial reporting outcomes; in fact, results 
typically reveal that it is short tenure which is associated with these outcomes (see for example, 
Johnson et al. 2002; Myers et al. 2003; Carcello and Nagy 2004; Geiger and Raghunandan 2002; 
and Stanley and Dezoort 2007). 
One issue frequently brought up in discussions of mandatory rotation is that there is a “level 
of 'coziness' the firm [has] with the management of the company being audited” (PCAOB 2011)3, 
particularly for companies with lengthy relationships with their audit firm.4 This concern over 
“coziness” between the auditor and client is consistent with the attachment concept. Attachment is 
described as the “binding of one party to another” (Salancik 1977; Staw 1982 as described by 
Seabright et al. 1992) and “accrues through experience in the exchange relationship and as a result 
of investments the exchange partners make in the relationship over time” (Seabright et al. 1992). In 
examining questions regarding lengthy relationships between clients and auditors, groups such as 
regulators, accounting professionals, and researchers have focused primarily on the auditor side of 
the relation, by concentrating on the length of time that the auditor (i.e., audit firm) has been 
performing the audit. However, financial statements are a joint outcome from the efforts of 
management who prepare them, the auditor who expresses an opinion on them, and the audit 
committee who is charged with the financial reporting oversight of the company. Thus, in my study 
I consider the interrelationships of these groups and their association with earnings management and 
accrual quality. Therefore, I examine the issue of auditor tenure from a new perspective and use a 
different definition of tenure. I define tenure in my study based on the shared history between the 
people involved in the financial reporting process.  
                                                 
3
 These views were expressed at a March 16, 2011 PCAOB Investor Advisory Group Meeting, where some members of 
this advisory group urged the PCAOB to consider mandatory rotation. 
4
 The largest 100 companies (based on market capitalization) have an average auditor tenure of 28 years and the largest 
500 companies have an average auditor tenure of 21 years (PCAOB 2011). 
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First, I examine how the collaborative tenure5 between the auditor and the top managers 
(CEO) is associated with earnings management and accrual quality.6 Second, I examine how the 
collaborative tenure among these three groups (auditor, manager, and audit committee) is associated 
with earnings management and accrual quality. I specifically focus on the collaborative tenure of the 
auditor, manager (CEO) and the audit committee chair. Third, I examine the association of the 
collaborative tenure of the auditor and managers with earnings management and accruals quality 
across different audit committee chair tenure lengths.  
I focus on the tenure of the audit committee chair, rather than the entire audit committee 
following the reasoning of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) which mandates the rotation of the 
person(s) in charge of the audit (i.e., the audit partner and concurring partner) as a way to provide a 
“fresh viewpoint” to the engagement, despite the fact that most of the audit team remains in place. 
The audit committee as a whole is charged with the financial reporting oversight of the company 
and the audit committee chair is the head of the audit committee, similar to the engagement partner 
being in charge of the individual audit. 
The second part of my study examines the effect of an audit committee chair change and 
how this impacts earnings management and accrual quality. Prior research has not analyzed what 
occurs when the client-auditor relation is “broken or changed” because of changes in the individuals 
charged with the oversight of the financial reporting process. Audit committees are charged with 
this duty and in dealing with the auditor (hiring, firing, and reviewing the performance of the 
auditor). Thus, it would be important to know how changing a key audit committee person, such as 
the chair, is associated with earnings management and accrual quality.  A new audit committee chair 
has the potential to change the dynamic of the auditing process by asking more questions or 
                                                 
5
 The collaborative tenure is calculated as the shortest time that the auditor (i.e., audit firm) and the manager (CEO) have 
served together at the client in these roles.  
6
 I also examine the collaborative tenure of the CFO and the joint tenure of the CEO and CFO in a sensitivity analysis. 
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focusing more attention on different issues than in the past. On the other hand, they could also be 
more reliant on the external auditor as they transition into their new role.  Therefore, my fourth test 
examines the association of audit committee chair changes with earnings management and accrual 
quality. My fifth test expands on this concept by examining the association of audit committee chair 
changes with earnings management and accrual quality across different lengths of auditor tenure7 
(i.e., short, medium or long). My final test examines the association of audit committee chair 
changes and the collaborative tenure of the manager and auditor with earnings management and 
accrual quality. These two tests differ in that the first one considers the entire auditor tenure history, 
while the second one considers only the joint collaborative tenure of the auditor and manager. 
I contribute to the literature as follows. First, I add a new dynamic in assessing the 
association of lengthy auditor-client relations and earnings management and accrual quality, by 
considering the audit committee chair tenure and audit committee chair changes.8 This analysis is 
important because the audit committee is charged with financial reporting oversight and its 
significance has been a topic of comprehensive interest to both regulators and business 
professionals. Second, the PCAOB and others have expressed concern that auditors become “cozy” 
with their clients and perhaps more likely to accept management’s representations which could 
result in a negative impact on the financial statements. Therefore, I use a measure that allows me to 
identify and test the most likely scenario in which this situation could happen. Specifically, when 
the auditor and manager have served together for long periods, and when the auditor, manager and 
audit committee chair have served together for long periods. This new definition of tenure is 
relevant because these are the three primary groups responsible for the financial statements. My 
                                                 
7
 Audit firm tenure is frequently referred to as “auditor tenure” in academic and regulatory studies and is used 
throughout the paper. 
8
 Wang and Wang (2012) also utilize a collaborative tenure measure. With data from Taiwan, they examine the 
association of the collaborative tenure of the audit partner and managers of the company (CEO, CFO) with discretionary 
accruals. 
5 
 
study is not implying that audit committee members or auditors do not perform their jobs with due 
diligence; there are legal and reputational penalties to both groups for bad financial reporting 
outcomes (Srinivasan 2005; Johnstone 2011; Weber et al. 2008). I am simply examining how close 
relations in groups affect the financial reporting process, a topic of continuing interest among 
regulators and investors.  
I find that longer collaborative tenure between the CEO and the auditor is associated with 
lower positive discretionary accruals (i.e., less earnings management). This is contrary to the 
PCAOB’s concerns regarding long auditor tenure and lower financial reporting quality (PCAOB 
2011). The PCAOB’s August 2011 concept release called for further information regarding the idea 
of mandatory auditor rotation. This study provides evidence that longer auditor tenure is not 
necessarily an undesirable situation, if the long tenure is coupled with long tenure of the CEO. I do 
not find that the joint tenure of the three parties (CEO, auditor and audit committee chair) is 
significantly associated with earnings management or accrual quality. 
In the second part of my study, I find that the first year of an audit committee chair change is 
associated with an increase in positive discretionary accruals. I do not find that this association 
differs based on different lengths of auditor tenure. I do find that longer collaborative tenure 
between the auditor and the CEO constrains earnings management and there is an even greater 
effect when there is an audit committee chair change (i.e., there are lower positive discretionary 
accruals). Thus, consistent with the first part of my study, I find that there is a benefit to longer time 
served between the CEO and the auditor. 
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II. Background and Hypotheses Development 
Debate on Mandatory Auditor Rotation 
Central to the mandatory audit firm rotation debate is whether the auditors’ independence 
and objectivity is impaired as the tenure of the engagement with the client increases. The following 
concerns related to long auditor tenure were stated by the SEC Practice Section Executive 
Committee (AICPA 1992) [as summarized by Sinason et al. (2001)] 
1. “Auditors may grow too close to the clients’ management causing the auditor to identify 
with management’s problems and lose professional skepticism.  
2. Auditors may view the examination as a repeat of earlier engagements with the same clients. 
This may cause the auditor to anticipate results rather than evaluating important changes in 
client circumstances.  
3. Auditors may be tempted to smooth over problem areas in order to retain the engagement.  
Pleasing the client’s management may become the auditor’s priority, rather than following 
the professional standards.” 
The first two concerns express the idea that the auditor becomes too familiar with either 
management or the audit engagement itself, potentially causing the auditor to question less and put 
more reliance on management explanations. The last point is the view that as the tenure relationship 
increases, the auditor could become more concerned with maintaining the audit engagement and 
therefore, perhaps less willing to challenge the client on accounting positions that are not in 
compliance with the applicable accounting standards. If in fact, any or all of these situations do 
occur in lengthy tenure relationships it has the potential to lead to negative financial reporting 
outcomes such as fraud, restatements, or aggressive earnings management to meet earnings 
benchmarks. However, one frequent counterargument to concerns regarding long tenure is that 
mandating a regular auditor rotation could actually lead to negative financial reporting outcomes 
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because the auditor does not have the deep institutional knowledge about the client in a short tenure 
timeframe, particularly if the client is a large, complex, or international organization (Johnson 2002; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 2011).9 
 
Prior Research – Auditor Tenure 
Academic research has contributed to the debate on auditor tenure/auditor rotation by 
examining the association of audit firm tenure with audit quality and earnings management metrics; 
results on these relations have predominantly not supported the idea that long tenure relationships 
are negative. For example, Geiger and Raghunandan (2002) find a higher frequency of reporting 
failures in short tenure clients and Stanley and DeZoort (2007) find a negative relation between 
auditor tenure and the likelihood of a restatement, implying that short tenure is associated with 
lower audit quality. Myers et al. (2003) and Chen et al. (2008) find that discretionary accruals are 
lower in firms with long auditor tenure.10 However, with Australian data, Carson et al. (2012) find 
that accruals are lower in short tenure clients. Using pre-and-post-SOX data, Davis et al. (2009) find 
that compared to medium auditor tenure firms (5 -14 years), both short and long auditor tenure are 
positively associated with using accruals to meet or beat earnings forecasts. However, these results 
only apply to the pre-SOX period; in the post-SOX period there is no difference among the three 
auditor tenure groups. In addition, Blouin et al. (2007) find that former Arthur Andersen clients with 
high levels of discretionary accruals that follow their audit team to the new audit firm have lower 
accruals in the year of the audit firm change, while those that did not follow their audit team 
                                                 
9
 For example, in his testimony before the PCAOB, Theodore Bunting, chief accounting officer at Entergy, noted that “ 
the utility industry is complex and requires expert auditors. ‘These complexities can require significant time to 
comprehend. Mandatory change in audit firms would result in disruption to our business and loss of auditor knowledge’ 
” (Cohn 2012). 
10
 Chen et al. (2008) uses data from Taiwan. 
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continued to report high accruals. These results do not support the idea that utilizing a new auditor 
improves financial reporting quality. 
During prior discussions of mandatory auditor rotation, the rotation of the audit partner was 
also considered as an alternative way to give the “fresh viewpoint” without the anticipated high 
costs of audit firm rotation. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) includes a provision requiring the lead 
audit partner and concurring partner to rotate off the engagement after five years. Prior academic 
research examining the association between audit partner tenure and audit quality or earnings 
management metrics has provided mixed results. For example, Manry et al. (2008) find that 
discretionary accruals are negatively associated with the lead audit partner’s tenure, implying that 
audit quality increases with partner tenure, however, the results hold only for small clients. They 
conclude that “partner tenure does not affect audit quality for large clients or for shorter-tenure 
smaller clients.” On the other hand, with Australian data, Carey and Simnett (2006) find that clients 
with long audit partner tenure are less likely to issue going-concern opinions and more likely to just 
beat earnings benchmarks, implying that audit quality diminishes with long audit partner tenure.  
In general, the U.S. studies do not support the idea that lengthy auditor tenure relations are 
associated with low audit quality and/or low financial reporting quality. In addition, Ghosh and 
Moon (2005) find a positive association between earnings response coefficients and auditor tenure, 
providing evidence that investors view longer auditor tenure relationships as enhancing earnings 
quality. Furthermore, although the PCAOB observed that, in some cases, the auditor relies too 
heavily on management’s representations without seeking corroborating and objective evidence, 
“preliminary analysis [of the inspection] data appears to show no correlation between auditor tenure 
and the number of comments in PCAOB inspection reports” (PCAOB 2011). Despite a lack of 
evidence supporting concerns over lengthy auditor tenure and a GAO 2003 study concluding that 
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“mandatory audit firm rotation may not be the most efficient way to enhance auditor independence 
and audit quality”, the PCAOB has brought attention to mandatory auditor rotation once again. 
Prior academic research has focused mainly on the auditor side of the relation in examining 
questions regarding auditor tenure. Although not stated explicitly, the studies which focus solely on 
the length of auditor tenure, are primarily examining the concern of the auditor getting too close to 
the engagement itself.  The issue is that the auditor possibly views the engagement as a repeat of 
earlier engagements or becoming overly concerned with maintaining the client’s business (AICPA 
1992).  However, the financial statements are a joint outcome from the efforts of management who 
prepare them, the auditor who expresses an opinion on them, and the audit committee who is 
charged with the financial reporting oversight of the company. Therefore, it is important to 
understand how the collaborative tenure of these three groups is associated with earnings 
management and accrual quality. I investigate this question by introducing a new measure of tenure 
which allows for a more comprehensive analysis of situations where the auditor has a higher 
likelihood of growing too close to management because of their shared time together.  
Wang and Wang (2012) also investigate collaborative tenure, specifically between the audit 
partner and managers (CEO and CFO). Consistent with the concerns previously mentioned by the 
SEC Practice Section (AICPA 1992), they argue that a long collaborative tenure between the audit 
partner and managers presents a “personal familiarity threat” where “auditors become familiar with 
the audit client’s management”. Wang and Wang (2012) find that discretionary accruals decrease 
with the collaborative tenure, implying that this familiarity is not associated with lower audit 
quality.  
My study differs from Wang and Wang (2012) in several aspects. First, I perform my study 
with audit firm tenure (i.e., auditor tenure) rather than audit partner tenure; therefore, I am 
10 
 
examining a different but important aspect of the auditor-client relationship.11 The PCAOB has 
expressed concerns regarding the bias of both audit partners and senior managers to accept 
management’s representations despite the fact that mandatory partner rotation has been in place in 
the U.S. since 2002. As such, it is important to examine the collaborative tenure of the audit firm 
(i.e., auditor tenure) and the client and not just the collaborative tenure of the partner and the client. 
In addition, using Australian data, Carson et al. (2012) find that discretionary accruals are lower in 
clients with both short audit partner and audit firm tenure, with the audit firm tenure being the 
dominant effect.  
Second, I further explore the idea of collaborative tenure with the addition of a new 
component: audit committee chair tenure. Third, I perform my analysis with data for companies 
traded on U.S. stock exchanges, while Wang and Wang (2012) use data from Taiwan. Finally, 
Wang and Wang (2012) use only one earnings management metric: discretionary accruals12 while I 
examine my research questions with the use of discretionary accruals (modified Jones 1991 with 
performance adjustment [Kothari et al. 2005]), real earnings management (Roychowdhury 2006) 
and the Dechow and Dichev (2002) accrual quality model (as modified by McNichols 2002).13 The 
addition of the real earnings management model is important to investigating these research 
questions in my post-SOX U.S. setting because Cohen et al. (2008) find that there is less use of 
discretionary accruals to manage earnings in the post-SOX environment, but more use of real 
earnings management techniques.  
 
                                                 
11
 The collaborative tenure is calculated as the shortest time that the three groups, auditor (i.e., audit firm), manager, and 
audit committee chair have been together. Later, I perform tests taking into account the entire audit firm tenure history. 
See research design for further details. I do not include any analyses regarding the audit partner because the names of 
the audit partners are not publicly available in the United States. 
12
 Wang and Wang (2012) also perform an auditor switch analysis given the collaborative tenure of the audit partner and 
mangers. I do not perform this type of analysis in my study. 
13
 I implement the accrual quality measure in a cross-section by year and Fama-French 48 industry classifications as 
implemented in Doyle et al. (2007). 
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Social Exchange Theory and other prior research 
Social exchange theory (SET) provides a basis to further understand the notion of the auditor 
growing close to the audit engagement and to the people associated with the engagement. SET has 
been described as “the view that interaction between persons is an exchange of goods [both] 
material and non-material” (Homans 1958) and which “recognizes the existence of relational bonds, 
such as trust, commitment, … and knowledge between [two parties]” (Vafeas 2010).  
The auditor, managers, and audit committee chair all interact to produce the final version of 
a company’s audited financial statements. Throughout the course of the fiscal year and the audit 
engagement “exchange interactions” (Lambe et al. 2001) occur, resulting in an outcome (i.e., 
audited financial statements). SET posits that “these outcomes are compared over time to other 
exchange alternatives…, with positive outcomes increasing trust with the trading partner and their 
commitment to the exchange relationship.” As the length of time that these parties have served 
together increases, “the positive exchange interactions produce relational exchange norms that 
govern the exchange relationship.”14 This idea is consistent with the view that greater trust between 
parties leads to more knowledge sharing (Tsai and Cheng 2011; Abrams et al. 2003) and that 
frequency of exchanges between parties “enhances the transfer of tacit knowledge among parties” 
(Jones et al. 1997). 
Therefore, consistent with Wang and Wang (2012) it is possible that there will be a negative 
association between collaborative auditor and manager tenure and earnings management/accrual 
quality because the two groups have served together longer, built up more trust between each other 
and established norms that serve the relationship well, encourage more knowledge sharing and 
facilitate better outcomes (i.e., less earnings management).  
                                                 
14These ideas are the premises of social exchange theory as discussed in Lambe et al. (2001).  
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However, it is also possible that the increased trust and established work patterns have the 
opposite effect on financial reporting quality. This idea of trust being created between parties is also 
consistent with prior accounting behavioral studies which offer important insights into auditor-client 
relations and the financial reporting process. For example, Rennie et al. (2010) find that the length 
of auditor tenure affects the extent to which auditors trust their clients, where longer tenure leads to 
greater trust. Additionally, Shaub (1996) discusses the concept that “an auditor’s level of subjective 
trust of the client is one factor in determining the nature, timing and extent of audit procedures”. 
Finally, Rose (2007) find that more trusting auditors pay less attention to evidence of aggressive 
financial reporting than less trusting auditors. Thus, taken together, these three studies imply that 
longer tenure leads to more trust with the client; a condition which can affect auditing procedures 
and may cause auditors to pay less attention to aggressive financial reporting (i.e., more earnings 
management).  
However, Bamber and Iyer (2007) provide support for either the possibility of a positive 
association or no association between collaborative tenure and earnings management. They find that 
auditors identify with their clients more as auditor tenure increases and those auditors who identify 
more with their clients are more likely to give in to the client’s preferred accounting treatment. 
Although, they also find that auditor tenure is not associated with the auditor being more likely to 
give in to the client’s preferred accounting treatment.15 
In terms of long working relationships, Katz (1982) find that engineering R&D project 
groups that have served together longer become more isolated from important sources of 
information outside their organization and had significantly less interaction among members of the 
group. Furthermore, “interparty attachment leads to maintaining an exchange relationship that 
                                                 
15
 This study does not perform a test interacting auditor tenure and auditor identification with the client. Thus, it does not 
assess the interactive effect of these two conditions on the likelihood of accepting the client’s preferred accounting 
treatment. 
13 
 
[provides] fewer of the needed resources than it originally did, curtailing the exploration of available 
alternatives” (Seabright 1992 summarizing Blau 1964; Cook 1977; Cook and Emerson 1978 and 
Hirschman 1970). Therefore, it is also possible that as collaborative tenure increases, the auditor and 
manger have less interaction or the auditor becomes more trusting of management. Both of these 
situations could potentially lead to the auditor becoming more accepting of management’s 
assumptions. Thus, long collaborative tenure could lead to a positive association with earnings 
management. 
 Given the possible competing alternatives, I offer the hypothesis below (in null form). 
 
Hypothesis 1:  There is no association between the collaborative tenure of the auditor and manager 
with earnings management and accrual quality. 
 Similar reasoning can be used when bringing the audit committee chair into the analysis. A 
lengthy collaborative tenure between these three groups (auditor, manager, and audit committee 
chair) could be an aid in constraining earnings management because of the institutional knowledge 
that both the auditor and audit committee chair possess from their longer “exchange interactions”, 
increased trust, knowledge sharing and established norms of working together. However, this longer 
tenure also has the possibility of leading to an overreliance on management’s assumptions because 
of this increased trust or “attachment” (binding of one party to another) through these repeated 
interactions. Alternatively, an audit committee chair could rely more on the external auditor when 
they are new to their role and thus do not have any impact on “breaking” the close relationship 
between the auditor and client. Given the possible competing alternatives, I offer the hypotheses 
below (in null form). 
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Hypothesis 2:  There is no association between the collaborative tenure of the auditor, manager, and 
audit committee chair with earnings management and accrual quality. 
 
Hypothesis 3:  The association of collaborative auditor and manager tenure with earnings 
management and accrual quality is constant among different lengths of audit committee chair tenure. 
In the second part of my study, I examine the effect of an audit committee chair change and 
how this impacts earnings management. Audit committees are charged with financial reporting 
oversight and in dealing with the auditor (hiring, firing and reviewing the performance of the 
auditor). Thus, it would be important to know how changing a key audit committee person such as 
the audit committee chair is associated with earnings management. This change could be a potential 
solution to enhance audit quality without the expected increased costs of switching audit firms and 
remains an empirical question which I investigate further. 
Prior team literature has noted that having a new member can stimulate change in the 
organization (Boeker 1997; Zellmer-Bruhn 2003), but it can also be a disruptive process because the 
team member that left may have taken important knowledge with him and it may take time to fully 
integrate the new member into the team functions (Chandler et al. 2005; Heinen and Jacobson 
1976). Thus, a new audit committee chair may change the dynamic of the auditing process by 
asking more questions and focusing more attention on critical areas. This situation could potentially 
lead to constraining earnings management. Alternatively, a new audit committee chair may need 
time to adjust to fulfilling their duties and could rely heavily on the external auditor and thus 
perhaps have no effect on “breaking” the close relation between the auditor and client.  
Given the possible competing alternatives, I offer the hypothesis below (in null form). 
 
15 
 
Hypothesis 4:  There is no association between audit committee chair changes and earnings 
management and accrual quality. 
 
The potential for a new audit committee member to bring change may be affected by the 
tenure of others involved in the financial reporting process. For example, Boeker (1997) noted that 
change within an organization was more likely after a new team member joined the group when the 
tenure of the other managers in the group was short. Consistent with this, firms with long auditor 
and manager tenure may be more resistant to change because “project members interacting over a 
long period will develop standard work patterns that are familiar and comfortable, patterns in which 
routine and precedent play a relatively large part” (Katz 1982). Thus, these long tenure firms may 
not exhibit a change in earnings management measures after an audit committee chair change 
because of these standard work patterns (Gersick and Hackman 1990). However, the new member, 
by providing different ways of looking at financial reporting issues, could potentially break up these 
patterns, perhaps resulting in a change in the earnings management measures. Thus, I offer the 
hypotheses below (in null form). 
 
 
Hypothesis 5:  The association of audit committee chair changes with earnings management and 
accrual quality is constant among different lengths of auditor tenure. 
 
Hypothesis 6:  Audit committee chair changes do not modify the association of the collaborative 
tenure of the auditor and managers with earnings management and accrual quality. 
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III. Sample and research design 
Sample 
I include in my sample all companies traded on U.S. stock exchanges that have the required 
data in the Corporate Library, ExecuComp, and Compustat databases for fiscal years 2005 to 2009. I 
also use data from Audit Analytics for sensitivity tests. I obtain data regarding CFO and audit 
committee chair tenure, board size, and audit committee chair changes from the Corporate Library. 
CEO tenure and CEO duality are obtained from ExecuComp. Auditor tenure and all financial 
variables are retrieved from Compustat; data from CRSP is used to determine company age; and 
information on restatements and internal control weaknesses comes from Audit Analytics. I exclude 
regulated industries and financial companies (SIC codes 4400-4999 and 6000-6999) from the 
sample due to differences in the operating environment of these firms. Following prior research (eg. 
Johnson et al. 2002; Davis et al. 2009), I exclude firms with auditor tenure of one year because of 
differences in discretionary accruals in the initial engagement year (DeFond and Subramanyam 
1998). I also require that firms have at least four years of data to be in the final sample.16 
 
Dependent variables 
I use three types of dependent variables: two earnings management measures (discretionary 
accruals and real earnings management) and one accrual quality measure which I describe in further 
detail below. 
Discretionary accruals 
Discretionary accruals are calculated using the Jones model (1991) as modified by Dechow 
et al. (1995) with the performance adjustment from Kothari et al. (2005). I estimate the model in a 
                                                 
16
 This condition is relaxed later when I test only the subsample with positive discretionary accruals. 
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cross-section for each year and two-digit SIC code in order to allow the coefficients to vary across 
time and industry (eg. DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; Cohen et al. 2008). 
The estimated modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995) with the performance 
modification from Kothari et al. (2005) is: 
       TAit      =   γ1       1        +    γ2    ∆Revit   +  γ3    PPEit       + γ4ROAit +    εit             (1) 
   Assetsi,t-1            Assetsi,t-1            Assetsi,t-1         Assetsi,t-1 
 
Where, for fiscal year t and firm i: 
 
TAit = earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations (EBXIit, annual) minus 
operating cash flow from continuing operations (CFO, from the statement of cash flows,). 
Assetsi,t-1 =  total assets in the previous year (year t-1), 
∆Revit = change in revenue from the preceding year (year t – year t-1), 
PPEit = gross value of property, plant, and equipment, and 
ROAit = return on assets (net income/beginning assets). 
Next, the coefficients estimated in equation (1) (γ1, γ2, γ3, and γ4) are used to estimate the 
normal accruals (NAit) for each company in the sample as follows:  
 
       NAit      =   γ 1       1       +   γ 2 (∆Revit – ∆ARit) + γ 3    PPEit       + γ4ROAit         (2) 
                              Assetsi,t-1               Assetsi,t-1               Assetsi,t-1 
 
∆ARit = change in accounts receivable from the preceding year, and all other variables are as 
previously defined. 
Thus, discretionary accruals are defined as the difference between total accruals and the 
estimated normal accruals as: 
 
       DAit =         TAit          -   NAit                                                                        (3) 
                       Assetsi,t-1             
 
The discretionary accrual measure (DAit) is the measure that I use in the test model. I 
perform the following independent tests: 1) positive discretionary accruals only, 2) negative 
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discretionary accruals only, and 3) absolute value of discretionary accruals. The positive 
discretionary accruals are particularly important to examine because these could be used by 
management to increase income upwards in order to meet earnings targets. I also examine negative 
discretionary accruals because if a company is having either a particularly bad or good year then 
management may prefer to have “extra” expenses hit the income statement in the current year. In 
this way the company is either taking on “extra expenses” in a year when the company may not 
meet its earnings targets or in a year when the company has already easily met its earnings goals. 
Accrual quality 
I estimate the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model with the modifications introduced in 
McNichols (2002). The model is estimated in a cross-section by year and Fama-French 48 industry 
classifications (eg. Doyle et al. 2007). The accrual estimation errors are the residuals from: 
  ∆WCit = δ0 + δ1CFOit-1 + δ2CFOit + δ3CFOit+1 + δ4∆REVit + δ5PPEit + εit           (4)17 
 
Where, for fiscal year t and firm i (all variables deflated by beginning of the year total 
assets): 
∆WC = change in working capital from prior year, 
CFOit-1, CFOit, and CFOit+1 = cash flows from operation in years t-1, t, and t+1, 
∆REVit = change in revenue from the preceding year (year t – year t-1), and 
PPEit = gross value of property, plant, and equipment. 
 
 The measure of accrual quality is the standard deviation of five years of the accrual 
estimation errors noted above (year t to t-4). 
 
                                                 
17
 “The error term in equation (4) captures the extent to which accruals map into cash flow realizations, and can be used 
as a measure of accrual and earnings quality” (Dechow and Dichev 2002). 
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Real earnings management measures 
Cohen et al. (2008) find an increase in the level of real earnings management after the 
passage of SOX and a decline in the use of accrual-based earnings management suggesting that 
“firms switched from accrual-based to real earnings management methods after the passage of 
SOX”. Therefore, I also use the measures of real earnings management developed by 
Roychowdhury (2006)18 based on the work of Dechow et al. (1998). The three measures of real 
earnings management are: the abnormal level of cash flows from operation (CFO), abnormal level 
of production costs (Prod), and abnormal level of discretionary expenses (DiscExp). All models are 
estimated cross-sectionally by year and two-digit SIC code. 
Abnormal levels of cash flow from operation are the residuals from: 
     CFOit    =  α0  +   α1       1        +    α2     Salesit   +  α3      ∆Salesit       +   εit                 (5) 
  Assetsi,t-1                    Assetsi,t-1              Assetsi,t-1            Assetsi,t-1 
 
Abnormal levels of production cost are the residuals from:19 
 
   Prodit     =  α0  +  α1      1      +  α2   Salesit   +  α3   ∆Salesit   +  α4  ∆Salesit-1  +  εit       (6) 
Assetsi,t-1                  Assetsi,t-1      Assetsi,t-1        Assetsi,t-1          Assetsi,t-1 
 
Abnormal levels of discretionary expenses are the residuals from: 
 
   DisExpit   =   α0  +   α1      1       +   α2   Salesit-1     +   εit                                                (7) 
  Assetsi,t-1                     Assetsi,t-1         Assetsi,t-1      
                                                 
18
 I use the models as developed by Roychowdhury (2006). Cohen et al. (2008) modify the model by omitting the 
regular intercept.   
19
 Production cost (Prod) is defined as the sum of cost of goods sold (COGS) plus the change in inventories (∆INV) 
where:  
 COGSit    =  α0  +  α1     1        +  α2   Salesit    +  εit   (6.a) and  
Assetsi,t-1                   Assetsi,t-1        Assetsi,t-1        
   
 ∆INVit      =   α0  +   α1       1        +    α2   ∆Salesit   +  α3   ∆Salesit-1       +   εit       (6.b)      
 Assetsi,t-1                    Assetsi,t-1               Assetsi,t-1            Assetsi,t-1 
 
Thus, equation (6) is the combination of (6.a) and (6.b). 
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Discretionary expenses are defined as the sum of research and development expenses, 
advertising expenses, and selling, general and administrative expenses. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Test models  
Test 1 - Collaborative auditor and manager tenure 
I first assess the effect of the collaborative tenure of the auditor and managers on the 
dependent variables using the following model:  
Dependenti  =  β0  + β1AUD_TENi  +  β2CEO_TENi + β3MIN_CEO_AUDi  +  βxCONTROLi  +  εi     
(8) 
Dependent = the three dependent variables (discretionary accruals, accrual quality, and real earnings 
management) 
MIN_CEO_AUD = the minimum overlap in years between auditor and CEO tenure (where auditor 
tenure is calculated based on the audit firm’s tenure with the client)20,  
AUD_TEN = auditor (audit firm) tenure in years 
CEO_TEN = CEO tenure in years and 
Control = a set of control variables which are described at the end of this section. 
In addition to test one, I perform four additional tests that have the following similarities 
across the models:  
Test 2 - Collaborative auditor, manager, and audit committee chair tenure 
  I use the following model: 
                                                 
20
 For example, a company with an auditor tenure of 15 years and a CEO tenure of 5 years has a collaborative tenure of 
5 years. Later, I perform tests across different auditor tenure lengths. 
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Dependenti = β0 +  β 1AUD_TENi + β 2CEO_TENi  + β 3ACCH_TENi  +   
β
 4MIN_CEO_ AUDi + β 5MIN_CEO_ACCHi +  β 6MIN_ ACCH_AUDi + β 
7MIN_CEO_ACCH_AUDi + βxCONTROLi + εi           (9) 
The test variable (MIN_CEO_ACCH_AUD) is the minimum overlap in years between 
auditor, CEO and audit committee chair tenure. Audit committee chair tenure is the time (measured 
in years) that the audit committee chair has served as a board member on that specific company.21 
Refer to Table 1 for the definitions of the other variables. 
Test 3 - Collaborative auditor and manager tenure across different audit committee chair tenure 
lengths 
Next, I perform an analysis using the collaborative auditor and CEO tenure interacted with 
audit committee chair tenure. I use the following model:  
Dependenti = β0 + β1LONG_ACCHi +  β2CEO_TENi +  β3AUD_TENi  + β4MIN_CEO_AUDi + 
β5LACCHi * CEO_TENi + β6LACCHi * AUD_TENi + β7LACCHi *MIN_CEO_AUDi + βxCONTROLi  
+ εi                       (10) 
The test variable is LACCH * MIN_CEO_AUD. This is the interaction of 1) LONG_ACCH, 
a categorical variable equal to one if the tenure of the audit committee chair is above the median, 
zero otherwise and 2) MIN_CEO_AUD, which measures the minimum overlap in years between 
auditor and CEO tenure. Refer to Table 1 for the definitions of the other variables. 
 
 
                                                 
21
 The tenure as audit committee chair or audit committee member is not available in Corporate Library, only the time 
served as a board member. This duration (as a board member) better reflects potential relations that could have been 
built with managers and external auditors over time.  
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Test models for audit committee chair changes 
My last set of tests examine audit committee chair changes and the association with the 
dependent variables across three settings: Audit committee chair changes (Test 4), Audit committee 
chair changes and different auditor tenure lengths (Test 5), and Audit committee chair changes and 
the collaborative tenure of managers and the audit firm (Test 6). 
Test 4 - Audit committee chair changes  
I use the following model: 
Dependenti = β0 + β1ACCHD1i + ACCHD2i + β3ACCHD3i + βxCONTROLi      + εi                    (11) 
ACCHD1 is a dichotomous variable that equals one if the audit committee chair changes 
from the prior year, zero otherwise. ACCHD2 is a dichotomous variable that equals one in the year 
after an audit committee chair change, zero otherwise. ACCHD3 is a dichotomous variable that 
equals one in the second year after an audit committee chair change, zero otherwise.  
Test 5 - Audit committee chair changes across different lengths of auditor tenure 
I use the following model: 
Dependenti = β0 + β1ACCHD1i + β2SHORT_Di + β3LONG_Di + β4ACCD1*SHORT_Di + 
β5ACCD1*LONG_Di + βxCONTROLi      + εi                    (12) 
ACCHD1 is a dichotomous variable that equals one if the audit committee chair changes 
from the prior year, zero otherwise. I use three categories to classify auditor tenure as short, 
medium, and long, with medium being the base line (the omitted category). 
Consistent with Davis et al. (2009), I divide auditor tenure as follows: 
SHORT_D = auditor tenure of 2 or 3 years 
Medium = auditor tenure of 4-14 years (omitted category) 
LONG_D = auditor tenure greater than or equal to 15 years 
 
I also perform sensitivity tests with the following alternative category: 
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SHORT_P = auditor tenure of 1-10 years  
LONG_P = auditor tenure greater than 10 years (omitted category) 
 
In the PCAOB concept release 2011-006, the PCAOB expressed particular interest in receiving comments on 
auditor tenure relations greater than 10 years. 
Refer to Table 1 for definitions of the other variables. 
 
Test 6 - Audit committee chair changes and the collaborative tenure of managers and the auditor 
I use the following model: 
Dependenti = β0 + β1ACCHD1i +  β2AUD_TENi +  β3CEO_TENi +  β4MIN_CEO_AUDi + β5 
ACCHD1* AUD_TENi  + β6 ACCHD1* CEO_TENi  + 
 β7 ACCHD1*MIN_CEO_AUDi + βxCONTROLi + εi            (13) 
ACCHD1 represents changes in the audit committee chair from the prior year as and the 
variable MIN_CEO_AUD measures the minimum overlap in years between auditor and CEO 
tenure. 
Control variables 
I include controls for variables that are expected to be negatively associated with earnings 
management: SIZE (natural log of total assets), Cash flow from operations (CFO, operating cash 
flows divided by beginning total assets), Altman Z-score, AGE (number of years in CRSP), BIG_N 
(dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is audited by a Big 4 auditor, 0 otherwise) and IMPORT 
(local client importance, calculated per auditor office as the individual client audit fees/total audit 
fees). I also control for LEVERAGE (total liabilities divided by total assets), SALE_GROWTH, 
CEO DUALITY and Board Size which are expected to be positively associated with earnings 
management (Johnson et al. 2002; Myers et al. 2003; Manry et al. 2008; Gul et al. 2009; Wang and 
Wang 2012; Li et al. 2009; Vafeas 2005; Dechow et al. 1996; Dhailiwal et al. 2010; Carcello and 
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Nagy 2004).  I also include a TREND variable to account for any changes in earnings management 
over time. 
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IV. Results 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 Table 2 reports the results of the descriptive statistics. Panel A contains the information for 
the full sample of companies used across all three models (discretionary accruals, real earnings 
management, and accrual quality) and Panel B reports information for the sample of companies with 
positive discretionary accruals. I present descriptive statistics for the positive discretionary accrual 
sample because this is the subsample for which I find results in the regression analyses and for 
which I focus most of my discussion on. The descriptive statistics are very similar between Panel A 
and Panel B. In terms of mean values, most firms have a Big N auditor which they have engaged for 
15 years, the CEO has been in place for eight years, the audit committee chair has served on the 
board for seven years and 50% of the time the CEO is also the Chairman. 
Test 1 Results -  Collaborative auditor and manager tenure 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Table 3 reports results for the analysis of collaborative auditor and manager tenure using 
positive abnormal accruals as the dependent variable. The PCAOB has expressed concerns 
regarding the auditor growing too close to management and perhaps not exhibiting a high enough 
degree of professional skepticism. If this is the case, and the auditor relies too heavily on 
management’s assumptions, it may allow management to engage in aggressive financial reporting 
practices, particularly those which may help the company to avoid missing earnings benchmarks. 
Thus, the concern with managing earnings is generally one of managing earnings up, which could 
be accomplished with the use of positive discretionary accruals. 
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I perform the analysis following two different procedures. First, because the dependent 
variable (positive discretionary accruals) takes on only positive values and it is highly skewed to the 
right, I perform my analysis with a generalized linear model specifying a gamma distribution.  The 
use of a gamma distribution estimates parameters that ensure all fitted values will always be positive 
(which the OLS regression does not do), consistent with the original input values for the dependent 
variable.  Thus, the estimated parameters will be better.22 Second, I perform the same tests with the 
standard OLS regression commonly accepted in the accounting literature. The first two columns 
present results with the gamma regression and columns three and four are the results from OLS.23 
The dependent variable is calculated using the modified jones method (Dechow et al. 2005) 
with the performance adjustment recommended in Kothari et al. (2005) because the performance 
adjusted modification results in a better specified measure. Columns (1) and (3) use the minimum 
collaborative tenure approach described in Section III, where the variable MIN_CEO_AUD 
represents the minimum time the CEO and the auditor have served together. The coefficient on this 
variable is negative and significant at the 1% level indicating that longer collaborative tenure 
between the CEO and the auditor is associated with less positive discretionary accruals (i.e., less 
earnings management).24 In addition, the coefficient on the auditor tenure variable is not significant, 
                                                 
22
 The argument is the same when using a Binomial distribution when working with dichotomous dependent variables, 
or the use of a Poisson or Negative Binomial when working with count dependent variables. 
23
 The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is a measure of the relative quality of statistical models. The lower the 
values for AIC the better the model. Usually, a model is said to be better when its AIC value is at least lower by two 
when compared to a competing model (for example when comparing gamma to OLS). When comparing AIC values for 
the models in columns (1) and (2) of table 3 (-4.336 and -3.384, respectively) the reported values should be multiplied 
by N (893 in this case) in order to get the actual AIC values (-3872.05 and -3021.91), this is due to the way STATA 
outputs  
AIC values for generalized linear models versus OLS. Therefore, according to AIC criterion, the Generalized Linear 
Model using a gamma distribution is superior to the competing model (OLS). 
 
24
 Coefficients from the regression using a gamma distribution should be exponentiated, and their interpretation is a 
percentage change. Thus, the coefficient on MIN_CEO_TEN which is equal to -0.034231 suggests, keeping everything 
else constant, a 3.37% decrease in positive discretionary accruals for a one year increase in the joint CEO-auditor tenure 
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indicating no significant association between auditor tenure and earnings management. These results 
do not support the PCAOB’s concern that longer auditor tenure and possible close relations with 
management may lead to adverse financial reporting outcomes. In fact, the results provide support 
against the idea of mandatory auditor rotation, because the longer joint tenure between CEO and 
auditor actually constrains earnings management. 
The effect of MIN_CEO_AUD is consistent with Ali and Zhang (2012) who find that CEO’s 
incentive to manage earnings changes with their tenure. Specifically, they find that CEO’s manage 
earnings more in their early years with the company when they “have something to prove” and 
manage earnings less as tenure increases since the cost of having an earnings overstatement 
discovered would do greater harm to their established reputation. Thus, a longer tenured CEO has 
less incentive to manage earnings because he/she has already established a solid reputation and this 
condition coupled with a jointly longer serving auditor with significant institutional knowledge of 
the client is associated with less earnings management. However, the positive and significant 
coefficients of CEO_TEN in columns (1) and (3) is not consistent with Ali and Zhang (2012) 
Columns (2) and (4) present the analysis using the traditional interaction variable approach. 
The CEO_AUD variable replaces the MIN_CEO_AUD variable and is equal to CEO tenure 
multiplied by auditor tenure. For example, if CEO tenure is six years and auditor tenure is ten years 
then the MIN_CEO_AUD variable would have a value of six; while the CEO_AUD variable would 
have a value of sixty. The results for column (2) and (4) are consistent with that of columns (1) and 
(3); longer collaborative tenure between the CEO and auditor constrains earnings management.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
[exp(-0.034231)=0.9663; 0.9663 – 1=-0.0337=3.37%]. Thus, for example, starting at the sample mean (0.0487), a year 
increase in the joint CEO-auditor tenure indicates a decrease of 0.001641 in discretionary accruals. 
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The coefficient on CEO_TEN is positive and significant in all four specifications, indicating 
a positive association between CEO tenure and positive discretionary accruals (i.e., more earnings 
management). This result is also in columns (1) and (3) which use the minimum collaborative tenure 
variable. However, when interactions between continuous variables are used in a regression, as in 
columns (2) and (4), the coefficient on the base variable (i.e., CEO_TEN) does not have a very 
meaningful interpretation. Specifically, this coefficient (CEO_TEN) tells us the effect of CEO 
tenure when auditor tenure equals zero, which is not possible for this research setting.25 For 
example, when I set AUD_TEN at the sample median, the coefficient on ceo_ten is 0.0005776 
(0.0000319) for gamma (OLS) and is not significant. The use of regular interactions (rather than 
minimum joint tenure) allows for an additional analysis regarding the marginal effect of CEO tenure 
at different levels of auditor tenure. Using auditor tenure intervals of 2-30 years, I identify that CEO 
tenure is associated with an increase in positive discretionary accruals for auditor tenure of 2-9 years 
and a decrease in these accruals for auditor tenure over 20 years. There is, however, no association 
between positive accruals and CEO tenure at auditor tenure levels between 10-20 years. Thus, it is 
possible to conclude the following: a year increase in CEO tenure  is associated with increases in 
earnings management when auditor tenure is less than 10 years, has no association when auditor 
tenure is between 10 and 20 years, and is associated with decreases in earnings management when 
auditor tenure is longer than 20 years. Again, results do not support the PCAOB’s concern that 
longer auditor tenure and possible close relations with management may lead to adverse financial 
reporting outcomes. In fact, the results provide evidence against the idea of mandatory auditor 
rotation, because short auditor tenure is associated with more earnings management when CEO’s are 
in their early years with the company. 
                                                 
25
 The same explanation holds true for the ceo_ten variable in the other tests; thus, I do not repeat the explanation in the 
other analyses. 
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The control variables that have a significant coefficient exhibit a sign in the expected 
direction as predicted by prior literature. Specifically, the SIZE, CFO, and IMPORT variables are 
negatively associated with positive discretionary accruals and the LEVERAGE and 
SALE_GROWTH variables are positively associated with positive discretionary accruals.26  
I also perform the same analyses using the following discretionary accrual dependent 
variables: (1) absolute value of discretionary accruals and (2) negative discretionary accruals. The 
test variable is not significant in any of these specifications. Therefore, the “benefit” that accrues 
from long collaborative tenure between the CEO and auditor is realized solely in positive 
discretionary accruals, a method used to increase earnings. This finding is important because 
executives usually have more incentive to manage earnings up to meet earnings targets in order to 
not miss analyst forecasts or thresholds for bonuses.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Table 4 presents the same analysis using the real earnings management measures of (1) 
abnormal cash flow from operation, (2) abnormal production costs, and (3) abnormal discretionary 
expenditures. If the auditor constrains the company’s use of accruals, then management may 
consider other alternatives to meet earnings benchmarks. One option is to affect the timing and 
amount of certain business decisions such as production costs or expenditures on discretionary items 
such as advertising or research and development. Cohen et al. (2008) find that in the post-SOX 
period companies are using more real earnings management techniques; thus, it is important to 
examine if these alternatives are used as a substitute for discretionary accruals. The table presents 
the results using OLS only. A gamma distribution is not needed because the real earnings 
                                                 
26
 The same basic trends are in the remaining analyses, thus, I do not discuss the control variables for the remaining 
tests. 
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management measures are used with signed values (i.e., positive and negative), thus, not a one sided 
positive only measure for which a gamma distribution could be applied.27 The test variable, 
(MIN_CEO_AUD) is not significant in any of the three specifications, thus, there is no association 
between long collaborative CEO and auditor tenure and the use of real earnings management 
measures. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Table 5 reports the results of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model as modified by 
McNichols (2002). The variable of interest, MIN_CEO_AUD, is not significant, indicating no 
significant association between collaborative CEO and auditor tenure and the standard deviation of 
abnormal accruals. 
Test 2 Results - Collaborative auditor, manager, and audit committee chair tenure 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Table 6 reports results for the analysis of collaborative auditor, manager, and audit 
committee chair tenure using positive abnormal accruals as the dependent variable, with a gamma 
regression. The analysis includes the base variables for each tenure category (AUD_TEN, 
CEO_TEN, ACCH_TEN), each two way tenure combination of these variables (MIN_CEO_AUD, 
MIN_CEO_ACCH, MIN_ACCH_AUD) and finally the three-way tenure combination for all three 
categories (MIN_CEO_AUD_ACCH). Columns (1) and (2) use the minimum collaborative tenure, 
where the variable MIN_CEO_AUD_ACCH represents the minimum time the CEO, auditor, and 
audit committee chair have served together. Columns (3) and (4) present the analysis using a more 
traditional interaction variable. 
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 The same holds true for the other real earnings management analyses for tests 2-5; only OLS is used. 
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The coefficient on the three way collaborative tenure variable is not significant in any of the 
specifications (MIN_CEO_AUD_ACCH or CEO_AUD_ACCH), indicating no association between 
it and positive abnormal accruals. The coefficient on the minimum collaborative tenure between 
CEO and auditor is negative and significant at the 1% level (MIN_CEO_AUD). This is consistent 
with the conclusion reached in test one; longer collaborative tenure between the CEO and the 
auditor is associated with less positive discretionary accruals (i.e., less earnings management).  
I also perform the same analyses using the absolute value of discretionary accruals and 
negative discretionary accruals as the dependent variables. Untabulated results reveal that the 
coefficient on the three-way minimum variable is only significant in one instance (10% level): the 
minimum tenure (i.e., MIN_CEO_ACCH_AUD) for absolute value of discretionary accruals using a 
gamma distribution. The minimum collaborative CEO and auditor tenure is not significant in any 
specification. Therefore, the benefits associated with long joint CEO and auditor tenure are found 
only in positive abnormal accruals; specifically, longer joint CEO and auditor tenure constrains 
earnings from being managed upward. Thus far it appears that the tenure of the audit committee 
chair has no significant association in relation to the company’s use of discretionary accruals. 
However, I further examine this issue in test 3 by examining how results may differ in short versus 
long audit committee chair tenure.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
Table 7 presents the results using the real earnings management measures described in 
Section III. Unlike the positive discretionary accruals analysis, the MIN_CEO_AUD variable is not 
significant; indicating no significant association between joint CEO and auditor tenure with real 
earnings management measures. In addition, the three-way minimum variable 
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(MIN_CEO_ACCH_AUD) is also not significantly associated with the real earnings management 
measures. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
Table 8 reports the results of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model as modified by 
McNichols (2002). The variable of interest, MIN_CEO_ACCH_AUD, is not significant, indicating 
no significant association between collaborative CEO, auditor, and audit committee chair tenure and 
the standard deviation of abnormal accruals. 
Test 3 Results - Collaborative auditor and manager across different audit committee chair lengths 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
Table 9 reports results for the positive abnormal accrual analysis of collaborative auditor and 
manager tenure when splitting the sample between high and low audit committee chair tenure.28 The 
analysis includes the MIN_CEO_AUD variable, the base variables AUD_TEN and CEO_TEN, a 
dummy variable to indicate long audit committee chair tenure (LONG_ACCH), and all interactions 
between the LONG_ACCH variable and the CEO_TEN, AUD_TEN, and MIN_CEO_AUD. 
Columns 1 (3) and 2 (4) present the results using minimum collaborative tenure and regular 
interactions for gamma (OLS).  
For column 1, the coefficient on MIN_CEO_AUD is negative and significant at the 1% level 
indicating that longer collaborative tenure between the CEO and auditor decreases earnings 
management (i.e., positive discretionary accruals) for companies with short audit committee chair 
tenure. The coefficient on LACCH*MIN_CEO_AUD is positive and significant at the 5% level, 
indicating a differential effect for companies with long audit committee chair tenure. The joint test 
                                                 
28
 High audit committee chair tenure is greater than or equal to six years (the sample median) and low tenure is less than 
six years. 
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of LACCH*MIN_CEO_AUD + MIN_CEO_AUD is not significant, indicating that long 
collaborative tenure between the CEO and auditor does not decrease positive discretionary accruals 
for companies with long audit committee chair tenure. These results apply to the gamma 
distribution; however, there is no difference between short and long audit committee chair tenure 
when using OLS. In column 3, longer collaborative tenure between the CEO and auditor reduces 
positive discretionary accruals (MIN_CEO_AUD), but the LACCH*MIN_CEO_AUD is not 
significant, indicating no differential effect for companies with long audit committee chair tenure. 
This is the same conclusion when using regular interaction variables (columns 2 and 4) for both 
gamma and OLS. For these tests, we look to the CEO_AUD and LACCH* CEO_AUD variables. 
Thus, three out of four tests provide no evidence of a differential effect for collaborative auditor and 
manager tenure across different audit committee chair tenure lengths. Therefore, results for test 3 
predominantly provide the same conclusion as in test one. There is an effect for long collaborative 
tenure between the CEO and the auditor, but the effect does not differ based on audit committee 
chair tenure. 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
Table 10 presents the same analysis using real earnings management measures. For column 
1, the coefficient on MIN_CEO_AUD is not significant indicating that longer collaborative tenure 
between the CEO and auditor is not associated with real earnings management techniques for the 
companies with short audit committee chair tenure. In addition, the coefficient on 
LACCH*MIN_CEO_AUD is also not significant, indicating no differential effect for companies 
with long audit committee chair tenure. Thus, there is no significant association between 
collaborative auditor and manager tenure and abnormal cash flow from operations for companies 
with either short or long audit committee chair tenure. 
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For columns 2 and 3, the coefficient on MIN_CEO_AUD is not significant indicating that 
longer collaborative tenure between the CEO and auditor is not associated with real earnings 
management techniques for the companies with short audit committee chair tenure. For column 2 
(3), the coefficient on LACCH*MIN_CEO_AUD is positive (negative) and significant at the 10% 
level, indicating a differential effect for companies with long audit committee chair tenure. The 
positive coefficient on LACCH*MIN_CEO_AUD in column 2 indicates that companies with both 
long collaborative tenure between the CEO and auditor and a long audit committee chair tenure, are 
associated with higher abnormal production costs. Higher levels of production can lead to lower cost 
of goods sold, an alternative method for reporting higher earnings.29 The negative coefficient on 
LACCH*MIN_CEO_AUD in column 3 indicates that companies with both long collaborative 
tenure between the CEO and auditor and a long audit committee chair tenure, are associated with 
lower abnormal discretionary expenses, another alternative method for reporting higher earnings. 
Thus, in contrast to the results reported in Table 9, there is a differential effect based on audit 
committee chair tenure, with the result found in the subset of companies with long audit committee 
chair tenure.  
[Insert Table 11 here] 
Table 11 reports the results of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model as modified by 
McNichols (2002). The variables of primary interest, MIN_CEO_ AUD and 
LACCH*MIN_CEO_AUD, are not significant, indicating no significant association between 
collaborative CEO and auditor tenure and the standard deviation of abnormal accruals for 
companies with either long or short audit committee chair tenure. 
                                                 
29
 Refer to Cohen et al. (2008) p 765 for a discussion of how increases in production can affect reported earnings. 
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Test 4 Results – Audit committee chair changes  
[Insert Tables 12 and 13 here] 
Tables 12 and 13 report the results of the analysis of audit committee chair changes. I use 
three separate variables representing the first, second, and third year of an audit committee chair 
change (ACCHD1; ACCHD2; ACCHD3). Columns 1 and 2 use positive discretionary accruals as 
the dependent variable. In these specifications the coefficient on ACCHD1 is positive and 
significant at the 5% level; this indicates a positive association between an audit committee chair 
change and earnings management (i.e. positive discretionary accruals) for the first year with the new 
audit committee chair. The coefficients on ACCHD2 and ACCHD3 are not significant, indicating 
no association between an audit committee chair change in the second or third year after the change 
and earnings management. Since I only find results in the first year of the audit committee chair 
change (ACCHD1), I perform tests 5 and 6 using only the ACCHD1 indicator variable for audit 
committee chair changes when using positive discretionary accruals as the dependent variable. 
Columns 3-6 use the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model [with the McNichols (2002) 
modifications] as the dependent variable. Columns 3 and 4 present results for all companies for 
which data is available to calculate the Dechow and Dichev measure. In column 3 the ACCHD2 
variable is significant. It is negative and significant at the 10% level, indicating a negative 
association between the year after an audit committee chair change and the standard deviation of 
abnormal accruals (i.e. the audit committee chair change is associated with higher accrual quality). 
Since I only find results for the ACCDH2 indicator variable, I perform tests 5 and 6 using only this 
one audit committee chair change indicator variable for the accrual quality (Dechow and Dichev 
2002) analysis. The results in the accrual quality analysis differ from that found in the positive 
discretionary accrual analysis. The audit committee chair change is associated with higher positive 
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discretionary accruals (i.e. more earnings management) and the audit committee chair change is 
associated with higher accrual quality in the year after the audit committee chair change. Because of 
these seemingly conflicting results, I also perform two additional tests in columns 5 and 6. These 
columns display results only for companies that have positive discretionary accruals and have data 
necessary to calculate the Dechow and Dichev measure. In this set of tests neither the ACCHD1 nor 
the ACCHD2 variable is significant; indicating no association between an audit committee chair 
change and accrual quality for this smaller subset of companies. 
Table 13 presents the same analysis using the three real earnings management measures as 
the dependent variables. None of the three audit committee chair change variables are significant; 
indicating no significant association between an audit committee chair change and the use of real 
earnings management techniques. 
Test 5 Results – Audit committee chair changes across different lengths of auditor tenure 
[Insert Tables 14 and 15 here] 
Tables 14 and 15 report the results of the analysis of audit committee chair changes across 
different lengths of auditor tenure using positive discretionary accruals as the dependent variable. 
Table 14 reports results using the auditor tenure categories of short, medium and long following 
Davis et al. (2009) and Table 15 reports results using auditor tenure categories of short and long 
(PCAOB 2011). Columns one and three report results with the auditor tenure indicator variables. In 
Table 14 short and long auditor tenure indicator variables are used following Davis et al. 2009. With 
the gamma regression (column 1), I find that compared with medium auditor tenure (4-14 years), 
short auditor tenure (2-3 years) is positively associated with positive discretionary accruals. Neither 
the short tenure indicator variable (SHORT_D) or the long tenure indicator (LONG_D) are 
significant using OLS (column 3). The OLS results are consistent with the results in the post-SOX 
37 
 
period of the Davis et al. (2009) study. In Table 15, the PCAOB classification is used, splitting 
auditor tenure into two categories: short (10 years or less) and long (greater than 10 years). The 
SHORT_P variable is positive and significant at the 5% level (columns 1 and 3), indicating that 
short auditor tenure is associated with higher positive discretionary accruals. This is opposite to the 
PCAOB’s concerns of long auditor tenure being associated with negative financial reporting 
outcomes. 
Next, I perform the main analysis using the ACCHD1 variable (audit committee chair 
change indicator variable), the short and long auditor tenure variables (SHORT_D and LONG_D) 
and the interaction of these variables (ACCHD1 interacted with both short and long auditor tenure 
variables). Since I only find results in the first year of the audit committee chair change (refer to 
Table 12), I focus the rest of my analysis using only the ACCHD1 indicator variable for audit 
committee chair changes (refer to columns 2 and 4). The SHORT_D and the SHORT_P variables 
are generally positive and significant. This indicates that short auditor tenure firms without an AC 
chair30 change have higher positive discretionary accruals compared to medium (long) auditor 
tenure firms without an AC chair change for the Davis (PCAOB) classifications. This is consistent 
with the results reported in columns 1 and 3 which did not include any AC chair change variables. 
However, my research question is to assess whether the association of audit committee chair 
changes and earnings management differs across different lengths of auditor tenure. Table 14 
(columns 2 and 4) report the results for the Davis et al. (2009) classifications and Table 15 (columns 
2 and 4) report the results for the PCAOB (2011) classifications. 
For the Davis et al. (2009) classifications, the combined coefficients of SHORT_D + 
ACCHD1_SHORT_D are not significant (p-value = 0.649). This indicates that short auditor tenure 
                                                 
30
 I use the abbreviation AC chair change to represent audit committee chair change. 
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firms with AC chair changes are not different from medium auditor tenure firms with AC chair 
changes in regards to their association to positive discretionary accruals. The combined coefficients 
of LONG_D + ACCHD1_LONG_D are not significant (p-value = 0.614). This indicates that long 
auditor tenure firms with AC chair changes are not different from medium auditor tenure firms with 
AC chair changes in regards to their association to positive discretionary accruals. For the PCAOB 
2011 classifications, the combined coefficients of SHORT_P + ACCHD1_SHORT_P are not 
significant (p-value = 0.224). This indicates that short auditor tenure firms with AC chair changes 
are not different from long auditor tenure firms with AC chair changes in regards to their association 
to positive discretionary accruals. Thus, there is no difference in the association of audit committee 
chair changes with earnings management across different lengths of auditor tenure.  
[Insert Table 16 here] 
Table 16 reports the results of the same analyses as in column six of Tables 14 and 15 but 
with real earnings management measures as the dependent variable. I include the dummy variable 
ACCHD1 which represents a one for the first year of an audit committee chair change, auditor 
tenure indicator variables (Davis et al. 2009 or PCAOB 2011 classifications) and auditor tenure 
interacted with the audit committee chair change dummy variable. The first three columns use the 
Davis et al. (2009) auditor tenure categories and columns four through six use the PCAOB (2011) 
auditor tenure categories. The SHORT_D and SHORT_P variables are not significant in any of the 
six specifications. This indicates that short auditor tenure firms without an AC chair change are not 
different compared to medium (long) auditor tenure firms without an AC chair change for the Davis 
(PCAOB) classifications. However, I am interested in assessing whether the association of AC chair 
changes and earnings management differs across different lengths of auditor tenure.  
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For column 1, I find that SHORT_D + ACCHD1*SHORT_D is negative and significant at 
the 10% level (p-value of 0.057). This indicates that short auditor tenure firms with AC chair 
changes are associated with lower abnormal cash flow from operations compared to medium auditor 
tenure firms with AC chair changes. An alternative method for reporting higher earnings is to give 
customers more price discounts or offer more relaxed credit terms in order to increase sales; 
however, this in turn can lower the level of cash flow from operations. Thus, there is some evidence 
that short auditor tenure firms are associated with higher real earnings management, compared to the 
medium auditor tenure firms. The sum of LONG_D + ACCHD1*LONG_D is not significant (p-
value of 0.875), which indicates that long auditor tenure firms with AC chair changes are not 
different from medium auditor tenure firms with AC chair changes in regards to their association 
with abnormal cash flow from operations. With untabulated joint tests for columns 2 and 3, I find 
that both short and long auditor tenure firms with an AC chair change are not different from medium 
auditor tenure firms with an AC chair change in their association with abnormal production costs or 
abnormal discretionary expenditures. 
Using only two auditor tenure classifications (short and long) based on the PCAOB 2011 
concept release, I find that the sum of SHORT_P + ACCHD1*SHORT_P is negative and significant 
at the 10% level (p-value of 0.086). This indicates that short auditor tenure firms with AC chair 
changes are associated with lower abnormal cash flow from operations compared to long auditor 
tenure firms with AC chair changes. Thus, contrary to the PCAOB’s concerns regarding long 
auditor tenure, I find some evidence  that short auditor tenure firms are engaging in more real 
earnings management. Similar to the results with the Davis et al. (2009) classifications, in 
untabulated results I find no difference between the short and long auditor tenure groups with AC 
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chair changes regarding their association with abnormal production costs or abnormal discretionary 
expenses. 
[Insert Tables 17 and 18 here] 
Table 17 reports the results of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model as modified by 
McNichols (2002) using the Davis et al. (2009) auditor tenure classification. Untabulated results for 
SHORT_D + ACCHD2_SHORT_D are consistent with those found with the positive discretionary 
accruals in Table 14; short auditor tenure firms with AC chair changes are not different from 
medium auditor tenure firms with AC chair changes in regards to their association with the standard 
deviation of abnormal accruals (p-value of 0.127). However when examining the long auditor tenure 
firms results differ from the positive discretionary accrual analysis. Untabulated results for 
LONG_D + ACCHD2_LONG_D reveal that long auditor tenure firms with AC chair changes are 
different from medium auditor tenure firms with AC chair changes in regards to their association 
with the standard deviation of abnormal accruals. The long auditor tenure firms have a lower 
standard deviation of abnormal accruals compared to the medium auditor tenure firms (coefficient 
of -0.13348 and p-value of 0.047). Table 18 reports of same analysis using the PCAOB (2011) 
classifications for auditor tenure. Untabulated results for SHORT_P + ACCHD2*SHORT_P 
indicate that there is no difference when comparing short auditor tenure firms with an AC chair 
change to long auditor tenure firms with an AC chair change (p-value of 0.475) Thus, I find limited 
evidence that there is a difference in the association of audit committee chair changes with accrual 
quality across different lengths of auditor tenure; it is found in the longer auditor tenure firms using 
the Davis et al. (2009) auditor tenure classifications. They have a lower standard deviation of 
abnormal accruals and therefore higher accrual quality. This makes sense because earlier in Table 
12 I found a negative and significant coefficient on ACCHD2 (Table 12 – column 3). 
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Test 6 Results – Audit committee chair changes and the collaborative tenure of the auditor and 
manager  
[Insert Table 19 here] 
Table 19 analyzes whether the effect from the collaborative tenure of the CEO and auditor 
varies given an audit committee chair change. The dependent variable is positive discretionary 
accruals and the variables of primary interest are MIN_CEO_AUD and 
ACCHD1*MIN_CEO_AUD and CEO_AUD and ACCHD1*CEO_AUD for minimum 
collaborative tenure and regular interactions, respectively. In column 1 the coefficient on 
MIN_CEO_AUD is negative and significant at the 1% level, indicating that longer collaborative 
tenure between the CEO and the auditor decreases earnings management (i.e., positive discretionary 
accruals) for companies with no audit committee chair change. The coefficient on 
ACCHD1*MIN_CEO_AUD is negative and significant at the 5% level, indicating a differential 
effect for companies with an audit committee chair change. The same conclusion is reached using 
the regular interaction variables with a gamma distribution (column 2). The differential effect for 
companies with an audit committee chair change is not present when using OLS, however, as 
previously mentioned, using a gamma distribution provides estimates that fit the data better. Thus, 
the conclusion is that longer collaborative tenure between the auditor and CEO constrains earnings 
management (as found in test 1) and there is an even greater effect when there is an audit committee 
chair change (i.e., there are fewer positive discretionary accruals). 
[Insert Table 20 here] 
Table 20 reports the same analysis using real earnings management measures. Neither of the 
variables of primary interest MIN_CEO_AUD and ACCHD1*MIN_CEO_AUD are significant in 
any of the three specifications. This is consistent with the results found in Table 4 earlier; no 
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significant association between longer collaborative CEO and auditor tenure and the use of real 
earnings management measure. This test in Table 20 tells us that there is no effect for joint CEO and 
auditor tenure based on splitting the sample between a company having or not having an audit 
committee chair change. 
[Insert Table 21 here] 
Table 21 reports the results of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model as modified by 
McNichols (2002). The variable of interest, MIN_CEO_AUD and ACCHD2*MIN_CEO_AUD, are 
not significant, indicating no significant association between collaborative CEO and auditor tenure 
and the standard deviation of abnormal accruals for companies with or without audit committee 
chair changes. 
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V. Sensitivity tests 
I perform two additional versions for each analysis where manager tenure is based on: (1) 
the companies’ CFO tenure, and (2) the combined CEO and CFO tenure. Untabulated results 
replacing CEO tenure with CFO tenure reveal that there is no significant association between 
collaborative CFO tenure and auditor tenure. Additionally, there is also no significant association 
when considering the collaborative tenure of all three parties (CEO, CFO and auditor). The CEO is 
the head of the company and is the one who would have the final responsibility for missing earnings 
benchmarks. If a little “extra” is needed to meet those benchmarks it would likely be the CEO 
instructing the CFO to do what is necessary in the accounting records to meet the desired goal. 
Thus, if there is a benefit to be had from a longer time served with the auditor it makes sense that it 
would be with the CEO who has the final authority to make the decision as to whether or not to 
employ some “extra” measures. 
Prior research documents a positive association between audit committee turnover and 
accounting restatements (Srinivasan 2005; Arthaud-Day et al. 2005) and audit committee turnover 
and the disclosure of internal control material weaknesses (Johnstone et al. 2011). Restatement 
and/or disclosure of internal control material weaknesses could provide an incentive to improve the 
quality of the earnings reported by the company in future periods. Therefore, I conduct sensitivity 
tests to rule out the possibility that any difference in earnings management/accrual quality after an 
audit committee chair change is not due to these confounding events. I perform the following 
independent tests for the audit committee chair change analysis (tests 4-6) as follows: first, I control 
for accounting restatements in the three prior years (Srinivasan 2005); second, I control for internal 
control material weaknesses in the prior year (Johnstone et al. 2011); third, I drop firms with 
restatements involving fraud or SEC investigations because these types of events can produce 
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different outcomes (see for example Hennes et al. 2008). I perform these tests for the positive 
discretionary accrual sample, for which I previously found significant results. The results are 
predominantly the same with all three of the above additional specifications. In one instance (of the 
three modifications noted above) in Test 5 and one instance in Test 6 the significance drops one 
level, other than that all results are unchanged.  
Results are also unchanged when including industry fixed effects for the positive 
discretionary accruals analyses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45 
 
VI. Conclusion 
The financial reporting process is an outcome from three major parties: management, the 
auditor and the audit committee. Prior research has focused primarily on the auditor for research 
questions involving financial reporting quality and earnings management; however, my study also 
considers the effect of the CEO and the audit committee chair. I examine how the collaborative 
tenure between the CEO and the auditor is associated with earnings management and accrual 
quality, as well as how the collaborative tenure among all three groups (CEO, auditor, and audit 
committee chair) is associated with earnings management and accrual quality. I find that longer 
collaborative tenure between the CEO and the auditor is associated with lower positive discretionary 
accruals (i.e., less earnings management). This finding is contrary to the PCAOB’s concerns 
regarding long auditor tenure and lower financial reporting quality (PCAOB 2011). The PCAOB’s 
August 2011 concept release called for further information regarding the idea of mandatory auditor 
rotation. This study provides evidence that longer auditor tenure is not necessarily an undesirable 
situation, either by itself and particularly not if the long tenure is coupled with long tenure of the 
CEO. I do not find that the joint tenure of the three parties (CEO, auditor and audit committee chair) 
is significantly associated with earnings management or accrual quality. 
In the second part of my study, I examine how audit committee chair changes are associated 
with earnings management and accrual quality. I find that the first year of an audit committee chair 
change is associated with an increase in positive discretionary accruals. I do not find that this 
association differs based on different lengths of auditor tenure. I do find that longer collaborative 
tenure between the auditor and the CEO constrains earnings management and there is an even 
greater effect when there is an audit committee chair change (i.e., there are fewer positive 
discretionary accruals). Thus, consistent with the first part of my study, I find that there is a benefit 
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to longer time served between the CEO and the auditor contrary to the PCAOB ‘s concerns 
regarding lengthy auditor tenure relationships. 
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Table 1: Variable definitions 
 
CEO_TEN 
 
AUD_TEN 
 
ACCH_TEN 
 
MIN_CEO_AUD 
 
CEO*AUD 
 
 
MIN_CEO_ACCH 
 
 
MIN_ACCH_AUD 
 
 
MIN_CEO_ACCH_AUD 
 
 
CEO*ACCH 
 
 
ACCH*AUD 
 
 
CEO*ACCH*AUD 
 
 
LONG_ACCH 
 
 
LACCH*CEO_TEN 
 
LACCH*AUD_TEN 
 
LACCH*MIN_CEO_AUD 
 
LACCH*CEO*AUD 
 
ACCHD1 
 
 
ACCHD2 
 
 
ACCHD3 
 
 
= 
 
= 
 
= 
 
= 
 
= 
 
 
= 
 
 
= 
 
 
= 
 
 
= 
 
 
= 
 
 
= 
 
 
= 
 
 
= 
 
= 
 
= 
 
= 
 
= 
 
 
= 
 
 
= 
 
 
CEO tenure in years; 
 
Auditor tenure in years; 
 
Audit committee chair tenure as a board member; 
 
Minimum between the CEO tenure and the auditor tenure; 
 
Interaction between CEO tenure (CEO_TEN) and auditor tenure 
(AUD_TEN); 
 
Minimum between CEO tenure (CEO_TEN) and audit committee chair 
tenure (ACCH_TEN); 
 
Minimum between audit committee chair tenure (ACCH_TEN) and 
auditor tenure (AUD_TEN); 
 
Minimum among CEO tenure (CEO_TEN), audit committee chair 
tenure (ACCH_TEN), and auditor tenure (AUD_TEN); 
 
Interaction between CEO tenure (CEO_TEN) and audit committee 
chair tenure (ACCH_TEN); 
 
Interaction between audit committee chair tenure (ACCH_TEN) and 
auditor tenure (AUD_TEN); 
 
Interaction of the variables CEO tenure (CEO_TEN), audit committee 
chair tenure (ACCH_TEN), and auditor tenure (AUD_TEN). 
 
Equal one if audit committee chair tenure is bigger than the sample 
median (ACCH_TEN>6); 
 
Interaction between LONG_ACCH and CEO_TEN; 
 
Interaction between LONG_ACCH and AUD_TEN; 
 
Interaction between LONG_ACCH and MIN_CEO_AUD; 
 
Interaction of LONG_ACCH and CEO*AUD; 
 
Equals one in the year of an audit committee chair change, zero 
otherwise. 
 
Equals one in the year after an audit committee chair change, zero 
otherwise. 
 
Equals one in the second year after an audit committee chair change, 
zero otherwise. 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
SHORT_D 
 
 
LONG_D 
 
 
ACCHD1*SHORT_D 
 
ACCHD1*LONG_D 
 
ACCHD1*AUD_TEN 
 
ACCHD1*CEO_TEN 
 
ACCHD1*MIN_CEO_AUD 
 
ACCHD1*CEO*AUD 
 
SHORT_P 
 
 
ACCHD1*SHORT_P 
 
SIZE 
 
CFO 
 
LEVERAGE 
 
BIG_N 
 
 
SALE_GROWTH 
 
DUALITY 
 
ALTMAN 
 
AGE 
 
TREND 
 
BD_SIZE 
 
IMPORT 
 
 
 
= 
 
 
= 
 
 
= 
 
= 
 
= 
 
= 
 
= 
 
= 
 
= 
 
 
= 
 
= 
 
= 
 
= 
 
= 
 
 
= 
 
= 
 
= 
 
= 
 
= 
 
= 
 
= 
 
 
 
 
Equals one if auditor tenure is two or three years, zero otherwise (Davis 
et all. 2009, classification); 
 
Equals one if auditor tenure is fifteen years or greater, zero otherwise 
(Davis et all. 2009, classification); 
 
Interaction of ACCHD1 and SHORT_D; 
 
Interaction of ACCHD1 and LONG_D; 
 
Interaction of ACCHD1 and AUD_TEN; 
 
Interaction of ACCHD1 and CEO_TEN; 
 
Interaction of ACCHD1 and MIN_CEO_AUD; 
 
Interaction of ACCHD1, CEO_TEN, and AUD_TEN; 
 
Equals one if auditor tenure is ten year or less, zero otherwise (PCAOB 
2011); 
 
Interaction of ACCHD1 and SHORT_P; 
 
Natural log of total assets; 
 
Operating cash flows divided by beginning total assets; 
 
Total liabilities divided by total assets; 
 
Equal to one if the auditor is one of the following: PWC, EY, KPMG, 
or Deloitte; 
 
(total sales – beginning total sales) / beginning total sales; 
 
equal to one if the CEO is also the Chairman of the Board; 
 
Altman-z score, a measure of the probability of bankruptcy; 
 
Number of years on CRSP; 
 
The difference between the year and 2005; 
 
Number of board members; 
 
Local client importance, measured as individual client audit fees/total 
audit fees (calculated per auditor office). 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for full sample 
 N=3,946   
      
 
25th 
Percentile Mean Median 
75th 
Percentile Std. Dev. 
DA -0.095 -0.054 -0.048 -0.005 0.089 
Abnormal cash flow -0.015 0.044 0.042 0.104 0.112 
Abnormal production costs -0.123 -0.025 -0.023 0.077 0.197 
Abnormal Discretionary expenditures -0.155 -0.031 -0.039 0.067 0.221 
DD (*) 0.016 0.030 0.024 0.036 0.022 
AUD_TEN 7.000 15.480 13.000 21.000 10.310 
CEO_TEN 3.000 8.060 6.000 10.000 7.160 
ACCH_TEN 3.000 7.330 6.000 10.000 5.840 
MIN_CEO_AUD 3.000 6.180 5.000 8.000 4.680 
MIN_CEO_ACCH_AUD 2.000 4.300 4.000 5.000 3.210 
SIZE 6.440 7.430 7.320 8.350 1.450 
CFO 0.073 0.123 0.116 0.172 0.103 
LEVERAGE 0.347 0.502 0.496 0.623 0.240 
BIG_N 1.000 0.953 1.000 1.000 0.212 
DUALITY 0.000 0.467 0.000 1.000 0.499 
ALTMAN 1.718 2.478 2.361 3.249 1.701 
SALE_GROWTH -0.230 0.071 0.667 0.164 0.278 
AGE 12.000 25.907 18.000 37.000 19.490 
BD_SIZE 8.000 10.034 9.000 11.000 3.281 
IMPORT 0.019 0.107 0.044 0.111 0.168 
      
(*) Sample size for standard deviation of abnormal accruals N=3,673 
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Table 2 (continued) 
     
      
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for positive discretionary accruals N=893   
  
    
      
 
25th 
Percentile Mean Median 
75th 
Percentile Std. Dev. 
DA 0.013 0.049 0.031 0.061 0.062 
AUD_TEN 7.000 15.627 14.000 21.000 10.316 
CEO_TEN 3.000 8.365 6.000 11.000 7.601 
ACCH_TEN 3.000 7.251 6.000 9.000 5.780 
MIN_CEO_AUD 3.000 6.342 5.000 8.000 5.019 
MIN_CEO_ACCH_AUD 2.000 4.259 3.000 6.000 3.166 
SIZE 6.175 7.180 6.990 8.024 1.453 
CFO 0.016 0.047 0.060 0.104 0.111 
LEVERAGE 0.368 0.534 0.522 0.669 0.244 
BIG_N 1.000 0.934 1.000 1.000 0.248 
DUALITY 0.000 0.424 0.000 1.000 0.494 
ALTMAN 1.563 2.309 2.329 3.264 1.901 
SALE_GROWTH -0.039 0.075 0.057 0.192 0.369 
AGE 12.000 25.931 19.000 36.000 19.314 
BD_SIZE 8.000 10.068 9.000 11.000 3.409 
IMPORT 0.016 0.107 0.043 0.114 0.168 
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Table 3: Test 1 – Collaborative CEO-Auditor tenure and positive discretionary accruals 
analysis 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
DAit = βo + β1AUD_TENit + β2CEO_TENit + β3MIN_CEO_AUDit (CEO*AUDit) + β4SIZEit + β5CFOit + 
β6LEVERAGEit + β7BIG_Nit + β8DUALITYit + β9ALTMANit + β10SALE_GROWTHit + β11AGEit + β12TRENDit +  
β13BD_SIZEit  + β14IMPORTit + εit 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
VARIABLES Gamma distribution Gamma distribution 
Regular interactions 
OLS OLS 
Regular interactions 
     
CONSTANT -2.449802*** -2.558248*** 0.058493*** 0.052345*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AUD_TEN 0.001152 0.005579 -0.000036 0.000233 
 (0.775) (0.246) (0.856) (0.311) 
CEO_TEN 0.013200*** 0.015442** 0.000552** 0.000827*** 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.041) (0.007) 
MIN_CEO_AUD -0.034231***  -0.001285***  
 (0.000)  (0.003)  
CEO*AUD  -0.001143***  -0.000057*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001) 
SIZE -0.127377*** -0.122498*** -0.003138* -0.003054* 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.080) (0.084) 
CFO -3.273261*** -3.233607*** -0.386700*** -0.387550*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LEVERAGE 0.387315** 0.368052** 0.022766*** 0.022566** 
 (0.017) (0.027) (0.010) (0.010) 
BIG_N 0.003250 -0.024482 -0.005392 -0.006309 
 (0.981) (0.855) (0.503) (0.438) 
DUALITY -0.000267 -0.037641 0.000299 -0.000797 
 (0.997) (0.623) (0.932) (0.823) 
ALTMAN 0.011750 0.006158 0.001741 0.001679 
 (0.709) (0.852) (0.246) (0.263) 
SALE_GROWTH 0.137439* 0.145188** 0.018383*** 0.018236*** 
 (0.051) (0.041) (0.005) (0.005) 
AGE -0.000572 0.000209 0.000020 0.000053 
 (0.782) (0.919) (0.852) (0.624) 
TREND 0.040203* 0.039392* 0.003597*** 0.003648*** 
 (0.073) (0.080) (0.001) (0.001) 
BD_SIZE 0.013041 0.008916 0.001590 0.001470 
 (0.509) (0.648) (0.113) (0.140) 
IMPORT -0.393119* -0.418530** -0.026093*** -0.027489*** 
 (0.054) (0.040) (0.004) (0.003) 
     
Observations 893 893 893 893 
AIC -4.336 -4.334 -3.384 -3.385 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
DA is the performance adjusted positive discretionary accruals. Columns (1) and (3) use the minimum between CEO 
tenure and auditor tenure (MIN_CEO_AUD) as the test variable. Columns (2) and (4) use regular interactions of CEO 
tenure and auditor (CEO*AUD) as the test variable. All variables are as defined in Table 1. 
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Table 4: Test 1 – Collaborative CEO-Auditor tenure and real earnings management analysis 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
REMit = βo + β1AUD_TENit + β2CEO_TENit + β3MIN_CEO_AUDit + β4SIZEit + β5CFOit + β6LEVERAGEit + 
β7BIG_Nit + β8DUALITYit + β9ALTMANit + β10SALE_GROWTHit + β11AGEit + β12TRENDit + β13BD_SIZEit  + 
β14IMPORTit + εit 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Abnormal cash flow from 
operation 
Abnormal production costs Abnormal discretionary 
expenditures 
    
CONSTANT 0.0082 -0.1214*** 0.1600*** 
 (0.714) (0.005) (0.004) 
AUD_TEN 0.0002 -0.0004 0.0003 
 (0.381) (0.578) (0.742) 
CEO_TEN 0.0002 -0.0006 0.0006 
 (0.595) (0.579) (0.598) 
MIN_CEO_AUD 
-0.0005 0.0011 -0.0007 
 (0.455) (0.481) (0.687) 
SIZE 0.0067*** 0.0185*** -0.0339*** 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.000) 
CFO 0.3880*** -0.7484*** 0.3062*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) 
LEVERAGE 
-0.0770*** 0.0463 0.0043 
 (0.000) (0.176) (0.900) 
BIG_N 0.0053 0.0570** -0.0504 
 (0.684) (0.024) (0.112) 
DUALITY 
-0.0036 -0.0093 -0.0004 
 (0.423) (0.400) (0.972) 
ALTMAN 
-0.0084*** 0.0125** -0.0123** 
 (0.006) (0.010) (0.030) 
SALE_GROWTH 
-0.0196*** 0.0495*** 0.0168 
 (0.009) (0.002) (0.351) 
AGE 
-0.0002* 0.0002 -0.0003 
 (0.083) (0.514) (0.499) 
TREND 
-0.0037*** 0.0028 0.0081*** 
 (0.000) (0.101) (0.000) 
BD_SIZE 
-0.0011 -0.0077** 0.0091* 
 (0.405) (0.034) (0.056) 
IMPORT 
-0.0359*** 0.0384 0.0280 
 (0.008) (0.237) (0.482) 
DA 
-0.4561*** -0.0085 0.1415 
 (0.000) (0.918) (0.191) 
    
OBSERVATIONS 3,946 3,946 3,946 
AIC -2.158 -0.556 -0.222 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
REM is one of three real earnings management measures as described in Section III. All variables are as defined in 
Table 1. 
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Table 5: Test 1 – Collaborative CEO-Auditor tenure and accrual quality analysis 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
STD_DAit = βo + β1AUD_TENit + β2CEO_TENit + β3MIN_CEO_AUDit + β4SIZEit + β5CFOit + β6LEVERAGEit + 
β7BIG_Nit + β8DUALITYit + β9ALTMANit + β10SALE_GROWTHit + β11AGEit + β12TRENDit + β13BD_SIZEit + 
β14IMPORTit + εit 
 (1) (2)  
VARIABLES Gamma distribution OLS  
    
CONSTANT 
-2.37648*** 0.06902***  
 (0.000) (0.000)  
AUD_TEN 
-0.00456* -0.00014*  
 (0.075) (0.052)  
CEO_TEN 
-0.00492 -0.00017  
 (0.232) (0.184)  
MIN_CEO_AUD 
-0.00015 0.00002  
 (0.980) (0.930)  
SIZE 
-0.14796*** -0.00448***  
 (0.000) (0.000)  
CFO 
-0.20980 -0.01005  
 (0.261) (0.239)  
LEVERAGE 0.24710*** 0.00699**  
 (0.004) (0.012)  
BIG_N 
-0.06378 -0.00516  
 (0.556) (0.257)  
DUALITY 0.02955 0.00053  
 (0.423) (0.630)  
ALTMAN 0.00523 0.00005  
 (0.656) (0.899)  
SALE_GROWTH 
-0.03570 -0.00202  
 (0.403) (0.369)  
AGE 
-0.00008 -0.00000  
 (0.950) (0.992)  
TREND 
-0.00479 -0.00023  
 (0.550) (0.352)  
BD_SIZE 
-0.00067 0.00005  
 (0.953) (0.873)  
IMPORT 0.07447 0.00125  
 (0.504) (0.672)  
    
OBSERVATIONS 3,673 3,673  
AIC -5.078 -4.861  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
STD_DA is the standard deviation of the residuals from equation (4). The test variable is the collaborative CEO-Auditor 
tenure (MIN_CEO_TEN). Refer to Table 1 for variable definitions. 
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Table 6: Test 2 – Collaborative CEO- Audit Committee Chair – Auditor tenure and positive 
discretionary accruals analysis 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
DAit = βo + β1AUD_TENit + β2CEO_TENit + β3ACCH_TENit + β4MIN_CEO_AUDit 
(CEO*AUDit) + β5MIN_CEO_ACCHit (CEO*ACCHit) + β6MIN_ACCH_AUDit (ACCH*AUDit) + 
β7MIN_CEO_ACCH_AUDit (CEO*ACCH*AUDit) + β8SIZEit + β9CFOit + β10LEVERAGEit + 
β11BIG_Nit + β12DUALITYit + β13ALTMANit + β14SALE_GROWTHit + β15AGEit + β16TRENDit + 
β17BD_SIZEit  + β18IMPORTit + εit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Gamma distribution OLS Gamma distribution OLS 
     
CONSTANT -2.4456*** 0.0577*** -2.5500*** 0.0523*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
AUD_TEN 0.0030 0.0001 0.0068 0.0003 
 (0.522) (0.476) (0.374) (0.389) 
CEO_TEN 0.0154** 0.0005 0.0191** 0.0008 
 (0.010) (0.104) (0.044) (0.102) 
ACCH_TEN 0.0108 0.0010 -0.0047 -0.0001 
 (0.480) (0.135) (0.750) (0.903) 
MIN_CEO_AUD -0.0379*** -0.0015***   
 (0.001) (0.006)   
MIN_CEO_ACCH -0.0236 -0.0010   
 (0.350) (0.421)   
MIN_ACCH_AUD -0.0211 -0.0018**   
 (0.192) (0.019)   
MIN_CEO_ACCH_AUD 0.0316 0.0019   
 (0.300) (0.193)   
CEO*AUD   -0.0015*** -0.0001*** 
   (0.009) (0.009) 
CEO*ACCH   -0.0003 -0.0000 
   (0.688) (0.988) 
ACCH*AUD   -0.0002 -0.0000 
   (0.822) (0.817) 
CEO*ACCH*AUD   0.0000 0.0000 
   (0.520) (0.573) 
SIZE -0.1269*** -0.0030* -0.1255*** -0.0030* 
 (0.000) (0.093) (0.000) (0.089) 
CFO -3.2661*** -0.3877*** -3.2239*** -0.3877*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LEVERAGE 0.3887** 0.0225*** 0.3723** 0.0227*** 
 (0.015) (0.009) (0.021) (0.010) 
BIG_N 0.0006 -0.0053 -0.0180 -0.0058 
 (0.997) (0.498) (0.893) (0.481) 
DUALITY -0.0052 0.0001 -0.0376 -0.0009 
 (0.944) (0.977) (0.623) (0.811) 
ALTMAN 0.0115 0.0017 0.0064 0.0017 
 (0.715) (0.255) (0.843) (0.258) 
SALE_GROWTH 0.1352* 0.0181*** 0.1472** 0.0182*** 
 (0.057) (0.006) (0.038) (0.005) 
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Table 6 (continued)     
     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Gamma distribution OLS Gamma distribution OLS 
AGE -0.0010 -0.0000 0.0005 0.0001 
 (0.644) (0.747) (0.800) (0.581) 
TREND 0.0416* 0.0037*** 0.0399* 0.0036*** 
 (0.065) (0.001) (0.077) (0.001) 
BD_SIZE 0.0137 0.0016 0.0110 0.0015 
 (0.482) (0.109) (0.564) (0.134) 
IMPORT -0.3758* -0.0243*** -0.4156** -0.0274*** 
 (0.062) (0.006) (0.040) (0.003) 
     
Observations 893 893 893 893 
AIC -4.329 -3.380 -4.326 -3.377 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
DA is the performance adjusted positive discretionary accruals. In columns (1) and (2) the test 
variable is the minimum among CEO tenure, audit committee chair tenure, and auditor tenure 
(MIN_CEO_ACCH_AUD). In columns (3) and (4) the test variable is the regular interaction of 
CEO tenure, audit committee chair tenure, and auditor tenure (CEO*ACCH*AUD). All variables 
are as defined in Table 1. 
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Table 7: Test 2 – Collaborative CEO- Audit Committee Chair – Auditor tenure and positive 
real earnings management analysis 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
REMit = βo + β1AUD_TENit + β2CEO_TENit + β3ACCH_TENit + β4MIN_CEO_AUDit + 
β5MIN_CEO_ACCHit + β6MIN_ACCH_AUDit + β7MIN_CEO_ACCH_AUDit + β8SIZEit + 
β9CFOit + β10LEVERAGEit + β11BIG_Nit + β12DUALITYit + β13ALTMANit + 
β14SALE_GROWTHit + β15AGEit + β16TRENDit + β17BD_SIZEit + β18IMPORTit + εit 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Abnormal cash flow from 
operation 
Abnormal production 
costs 
Abnormal discretionary 
expenditures 
    
CONSTANT 0.0098 -0.1260*** 0.1669*** 
 (0.665) (0.004) (0.003) 
AUD_TEN 0.0001 -0.0004 0.0003 
 (0.597) (0.631) (0.695) 
CEO_TEN 0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0004 
 (0.178) (0.767) (0.775) 
ACCH_TEN -0.0003 0.0010 -0.0021 
 (0.682) (0.447) (0.162) 
MIN_CEO_AUD -0.0006 -0.0002 0.0011 
 (0.471) (0.900) (0.592) 
MIN_CEO_ACCH -0.0018 -0.0015 0.0060* 
 (0.190) (0.611) (0.090) 
MIN_ACCH_AUD 0.0004 -0.0008 0.0008 
 (0.674) (0.734) (0.767) 
MIN_CEO_ACCH_AUD 0.0009 0.0040 -0.0069 
 (0.608) (0.354) (0.153) 
SIZE 0.0068*** 0.0185*** -0.0342*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.000) 
CFO 0.3907*** -0.7515*** 0.3084*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) 
LEVERAGE -0.0776*** 0.0461 0.0049 
 (0.000) (0.178) (0.887) 
BIG_N 0.0039 0.0600** -0.0538* 
 (0.771) (0.020) (0.096) 
DUALITY -0.0037 -0.0099 0.0002 
 (0.410) (0.376) (0.990) 
ALTMAN -0.0084*** 0.0124** -0.0122** 
 (0.006) (0.011) (0.031) 
SALE_GROWTH -0.0200*** 0.0494*** 0.0177 
 (0.009) (0.003) (0.331) 
AGE -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0003 
 (0.132) (0.537) (0.509) 
TREND -0.0036*** 0.0023 0.0087*** 
 (0.000) (0.174) (0.000) 
BD_SIZE -0.0010 -0.0080** 0.0095** 
 (0.448) (0.027) (0.042) 
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Table 7 (continued)    
    
 
(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Abnormal cash flow from 
operation 
Abnormal production 
costs 
Abnormal discretionary 
expenditures 
IMPORT -0.0350*** 0.0366 0.0295 
 (0.009) (0.260) (0.457) 
DA -0.4545*** -0.0098 0.1424 
 (0.000) (0.904) (0.189) 
    
OBSERVATIONS 3,946 3,946 3,946 
AIC -2.158 -0.555 -0.222 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
REM is one of three real earnings management measures as described in Section III. All variables are as defined in 
Table 1. 
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Table 8: Test 2 – Collaborative CEO- Audit Committee Chair – Auditor tenure and accruals 
quality analysis 
________________________________________________________________________________
STA_DAit = βo + β1AUD_TENit + β2CEO_TENit + β3ACCH_TENit + β4MIN_CEO_AUDit + β5MIN_CEO_ACCHit + 
β6MIN_ACCH_AUDit + β7MIN_CEO_ACCH_AUDit + β8SIZEit + β9CFOit + β10LEVERAGEit + β11BIG_Nit + 
β12DUALITYit + β13ALTMANit + β14SALE_GROWTHit + β15AGEit + β16TRENDit + β17BD_SIZEit  + β18IMPORTit + εit 
 (1) (2) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Gamma  
distribution 
Gamma 
distribution 
OLS OLS 
     
CONSTANT -2.36316*** -2.36613*** 0.07011*** 0.07000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AUD_TEN -0.00626** -0.00609** -0.00019** -0.00018** 
 (0.023) (0.026) (0.013) (0.015) 
CEO_TEN -0.00374 -0.00291 -0.00014 -0.00011 
 (0.481) (0.537) (0.408) (0.455) 
ACCH_TEN -0.01492** -0.01344** -0.00048*** -0.00043*** 
 (0.028) (0.025) (0.007) (0.008) 
MIN_CEO_AUD -0.00117 -0.00298 -0.00001 -0.00008 
 (0.880) (0.628) (0.962) (0.670) 
MIN_CEO_ACCH 0.00592 0.00092 0.00023 0.00005 
 (0.632) (0.897) (0.521) (0.824) 
MIN_ACCH_AUD 0.01574* 0.01336* 0.00049* 0.00040* 
 (0.086) (0.067) (0.054) (0.053) 
MIN_CEO_ACCH_AUD -0.00736  -0.00027  
 (0.656)  (0.583)  
SIZE -0.14767*** -0.14756*** -0.00449*** -0.00448*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CFO -0.19988 -0.19966 -0.00937 -0.00939 
 (0.283) (0.283) (0.271) (0.269) 
LEVERAGE 0.23964*** 0.23895*** 0.00675** 0.00672** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.015) (0.015) 
BIG_N -0.07183 -0.06941 -0.00585 -0.00577 
 (0.496) (0.510) (0.195) (0.201) 
DUALITY 0.02837 0.02707 0.00047 0.00043 
 (0.444) (0.464) (0.671) (0.700) 
ALTMAN 0.00599 0.00596 0.00005 0.00005 
 (0.610) (0.611) (0.897) (0.900) 
SALE_GROWTH -0.03660 -0.03755 -0.00206 -0.00209 
 (0.393) (0.382) (0.360) (0.354) 
AGE 0.00044 0.00043 0.00002 0.00002 
 (0.743) (0.751) (0.624) (0.635) 
TREND -0.00405 -0.00427 -0.00022 -0.00023 
 (0.615) (0.594) (0.381) (0.358) 
BD_SIZE 0.00095 0.00094 0.00010 0.00010 
 (0.933) (0.934) (0.760) (0.757) 
IMPORT 0.08344 0.08281 0.00137 0.00136 
 (0.460) (0.463) (0.644) (0.647) 
     
OBSERVATIONS 3,673 3,673 3,673 3,673 
AIC -5.078 -5.078 -4.863 -4.864 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 STD_DA is the standard deviation of the residuals from equation (4).  
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Table 9: Test 3 – Collaborative CEO – Auditor tenure across different audit committee chair 
tenure lengths – positive discretionary accruals analysis 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
DAit = βo + β1LONG_ACCHit + β2AUD_TENit + β3CEO_TENit + β4MIN_CEO_AUDit (CEO*AUDit) + 
β5LACCH*CEO_TENit + β6LACCH_AUD_TENit + β7LACCH*MIN_CEO_AUDit (LACCH*CEO*AUDit) + β8SIZEit 
+ β9CFOit + β10LEVERAGEit + β11BIG_Nit + β12DUALITYit + β13ALTMANit + β14SALE_GROWTHit + β15AGEit + 
β16TRENDit +  β17BD_SIZEit  + β18IMPORTit + εit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Gamma distribution Gamma distribution OLS OLS 
     
CONSTANT -2.373380*** -2.539185*** 0.059902*** 0.052436*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LONG_ACCH -0.252868* -0.210921 -0.007533 -0.006435 
 (0.075) (0.207) (0.259) (0.424) 
CEO_TEN 0.019764*** 0.016682* 0.000579 0.000731 
 (0.008) (0.070) (0.151) (0.112) 
AUD_TEN 0.002244 0.006373 -0.000001 0.000266 
 (0.672) (0.327) (0.997) (0.337) 
MIN_CEO_AUD -0.056454***  -0.001840***  
 (0.000)  (0.004)  
LACCH*CEO_TEN -0.010754 0.002588 -0.000024 0.000306 
 (0.290) (0.823) (0.966) (0.612) 
LACCH*AUD_TEN -0.001885 0.000567 -0.000097 -0.000035 
 (0.771) (0.944) (0.740) (0.924) 
LACCH*MIN_CEO_AUD 0.043519**  0.001170  
 (0.012)  (0.174)  
CEO*AUD  -0.001530***  -0.000068*** 
  (0.003)  (0.002) 
LACCH*CEO*AUD  0.000560  0.000019 
  (0.380)  (0.508) 
SIZE -0.128644*** -0.127897*** -0.003041* -0.003008* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.092) (0.093) 
CFO -3.280458*** -3.246734*** -0.386697*** -0.387891*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LEVERAGE 0.414528*** 0.405793** 0.023025*** 0.022961*** 
 (0.007) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) 
BIG_N 0.012837 -0.017530 -0.004564 -0.005584 
 (0.927) (0.900) (0.572) (0.494) 
DUALITY -0.000672 -0.033496 0.000135 -0.000998 
 (0.993) (0.663) (0.970) (0.783) 
ALTMAN 0.018057 0.011175 0.001880 0.001811 
 (0.538) (0.721) (0.205) (0.223) 
SALE_GROWTH 0.140311** 0.150546** 0.018456*** 0.018369*** 
 (0.038) (0.031) (0.005) (0.005) 
AGE -0.000133 0.000596 0.000026 0.000059 
 (0.949) (0.772) (0.807) (0.566) 
TREND 0.039227* 0.039800* 0.003573*** 0.003669*** 
 (0.074) (0.071) (0.001) (0.001) 
BD_SIZE 0.011281 0.012116 0.001580 0.001526 
 (0.562) (0.527) (0.114) (0.122) 
IMPORT -0.375763* -0.400112** -0.025561*** -0.027047*** 
 (0.066) (0.049) (0.007) (0.004) 
     
Observations 893 893 893 893 
AIC -4.336 -4.330 -3.379 -3.380 
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Table 9 (continued) 
 
** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
DA is the performance adjusted positive discretionary accruals. LONG_ACCH equals one if audit committee chair 
tenure bigger than sample median of six years, zero otherwise. In columns (1) and (3) the test variable is the interaction 
between LONG_ACCH and MIN_CEO_AUD (LACCH*MIN_CEO_AUD). In columns (2) and (4) the test variable is 
the interaction of LONG_ACCH, CEO tenure, and auditor committee chair tenure (LACCH*CEO*AUD). All variables 
are as defined in Table 1. 
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Table 10: Test 3 – Collaborative CEO – Auditor tenure across different audit committee chair 
tenure lengths – real earnings management analysis 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
REMit = βo + β1LONG_ACCHit + β2AUD_TENit + β3CEO_TENit + β4MIN_CEO_AUDit + β5LACCH*CEO_TENit + 
β6LACCH_AUD_TENit + β7LACCH*MIN_CEO_AUDit + β8SIZEit + β9CFOit + β10LEVERAGEit + β11BIG_Nit + 
β12DUALITYit + β13ALTMANit + β14SALE_GROWTHit + β15AGEit + β16TRENDit + β17BD_SIZEit  + β18IMPORTit + εit 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Abnormal cash flow from 
operation 
Abnormal production 
costs 
Abnormal discretionary 
expenditures 
    
CONSTANT 0.0087 -0.1221*** 0.1642*** 
 (0.700) (0.005) (0.003) 
LONG_ACCH -0.0081 0.0085 -0.0145 
 (0.345) (0.677) (0.553) 
CEO_TEN 0.0007 0.0003 -0.0011 
 (0.243) (0.802) (0.432) 
AUD_TEN 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 
 (0.848) (0.949) (0.785) 
MIN_CEO_AUD -0.0003 -0.0015 0.0023 
 (0.745) (0.453) (0.277) 
LACCH*CEO_TEN -0.0007 -0.0019 0.0035* 
 (0.280) (0.292) (0.075) 
LACCH*AUD_TEN 0.0004 -0.0008 0.0012 
 (0.308) (0.373) (0.272) 
LACCH*MIN_CEO_AUD -0.0004 0.0049* -0.0057* 
 (0.745) (0.069) (0.056) 
SIZE 0.0068*** 0.0185*** -0.0341*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.000) 
CFO 0.3893*** -0.7492*** 0.3054*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) 
LEVERAGE -0.0770*** 0.0454 0.0050 
 (0.000) (0.180) (0.885) 
BIG_N 0.0041 0.0595** -0.0519 
 (0.748) (0.019) (0.102) 
DUALITY -0.0042 -0.0094 0.0002 
 (0.349) (0.395) (0.986) 
ALTMAN -0.0083*** 0.0124** -0.0122** 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.030) 
SALE_GROWTH -0.0201*** 0.0496*** 0.0174 
 (0.008) (0.003) (0.336) 
AGE -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0003 
 (0.111) (0.528) (0.508) 
TREND -0.0036*** 0.0025 0.0085*** 
 (0.000) (0.146) (0.000) 
BD_SIZE -0.0010 -0.0078** 0.0092* 
 (0.434) (0.030) (0.054) 
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Table 10 (continued)    
    
 
(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Abnormal cash flow from 
operation 
Abnormal production 
costs 
Abnormal discretionary 
expenditures 
IMPORT -0.0334** 0.0358 0.0289 
 (0.011) (0.268) (0.463) 
DA -0.4549*** -0.0092 0.1408 
 (0.000) (0.911) (0.193) 
    
Observations 3,946 3,946 3,946 
AIC -2.161 -0.556 -0.222 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
REM is one of three real earnings management measures as described in Section III. All variables are as defined in 
Table 1. 
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Table 11: Test 3 – Collaborative CEO – Auditor tenure across different audit committee chair 
tenure lengths –accrual quality analysis 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
STD_DAit = βo + β1LONG_ACCHit + β2AUD_TENit + β3CEO_TENit + β4MIN_CEO_AUDit + β5LACCH*CEO_TENit 
+ β6LACCH_AUD_TENit + β7LACCH*MIN_CEO_AUDit + β8SIZEit + β9CFOit + β10LEVERAGEit + β11BIG_Nit + 
β12DUALITYit + β13ALTMANit + β14SALE_GROWTHit + β15AGEit + β16TRENDit + β17BD_SIZEit  + β18IMPORTit + εit 
 (1) (3) 
VARIABLES Gamma distribution OLS 
   
CONSTANT -2.33821*** 0.07077*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
LONG_ACCH -0.15476** -0.00600** 
 (0.041) (0.013) 
CEO_TEN -0.00428 -0.00021 
 (0.465) (0.225) 
AUD_TEN -0.00752*** -0.00024*** 
 (0.010) (0.004) 
MIN_CEO_AUD -0.00225 -0.00002 
 (0.783) (0.919) 
LACCH*CEO_TEN 0.00063 0.00013 
 (0.931) (0.563) 
LACCH*AUD_TEN 0.00708** 0.00024** 
 (0.041) (0.014) 
LACCH*MIN_CEO_AUD 0.00287 0.00003 
 (0.787) (0.922) 
SIZE -0.14708*** -0.00446*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
CFO -0.21161 -0.01013 
 (0.255) (0.233) 
LEVERAGE 0.24841*** 0.00697** 
 (0.003) (0.011) 
BIG_N -0.05549 -0.00503 
 (0.607) (0.265) 
DUALITY 0.02566 0.00039 
 (0.488) (0.723) 
ALTMAN 0.00696 0.00011 
 (0.548) (0.793) 
SALE_GROWTH -0.03601 -0.00198 
 (0.399) (0.377) 
AGE 0.00013 0.00001 
 (0.922) (0.821) 
TREND -0.00345 -0.00018 
 (0.666) (0.471) 
BD_SIZE -0.00143 0.00004 
 (0.900) (0.894) 
IMPORT 0.08420 0.00150 
 (0.452) (0.609) 
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Table 11 (continued)   
   
 (1) (3) 
VARIABLES Gamma distribution OLS 
   
Observations 3,673 3,673 
AIC -5.078 -4.863 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
STD_DA is the standard deviation of the residuals from equation (4). LONG_ACCH equals one if audit committee chair 
tenure bigger than sample median of six years, zero otherwise. In columns (1) and (3) the test variable is the interaction 
between LONG_ACCH and MIN_CEO_AUD (LACCH*MIN_CEO_AUD). In columns (2) and (4) the test variable is 
the interaction of LONG_ACCH, CEO tenure, and auditor committee chair tenure (LACCH*CEO*AUD). All variables 
are as defined in Table 1. 
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Table 12: Test 4 – Audit Committee Chair Changes 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES DA 
Gamma 
distribution 
DA 
OLS 
STD_DA 
Gamma  
distribution 
STD_DA 
OLS 
STD_DA 
Gamma 
distribution 
STD_DA 
OLS 
       
CONSTANT -2.50776*** 0.05650*** -2.44195*** 0.06678*** -2.26782*** 0.06955*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ACCHD1 0.23797** 0.01105** 0.00334 0.00011 -0.09842 -0.00223 
 (0.011) (0.038) (0.938) (0.935) (0.284) (0.505) 
ACCHD2 0.15245 0.00500 -0.06314* -0.00151 0.06068 0.00218 
 (0.138) (0.296) (0.086) (0.179) (0.427) (0.413) 
ACCHD3 0.10647 0.00610 -0.05203 -0.00125 -0.02251 -0.00049 
 (0.352) (0.366) (0.196) (0.311) (0.770) (0.858) 
SIZE -0.11134*** -0.00266 -0.14772*** -0.00445*** -0.11049*** -0.00310*** 
 (0.002) (0.142) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
CFO -3.23652*** -0.38712*** -0.19436 -0.00970 -1.67859*** -0.07737*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.306) (0.260) (0.000) (0.000) 
LEVERAGE 0.35277** 0.02164** 0.27141*** 0.00757*** -0.07604 -0.00228 
 (0.031) (0.012) (0.002) (0.007) (0.550) (0.615) 
BIG_N -0.06716 -0.00814 -0.08190 -0.00571 -0.24527 -0.01328 
 (0.599) (0.293) (0.436) (0.201) (0.147) (0.100) 
DUALITY -0.02385 -0.00073 0.01020 -0.00012 0.05454 0.00086 
 (0.745) (0.827) (0.774) (0.906) (0.348) (0.631) 
ALTMAN 0.00710 0.00163 0.00390 0.00000 0.00937 0.00080 
 (0.831) (0.272) (0.744) (0.999) (0.595) (0.313) 
SALE_GROWTH 0.14580** 0.01814*** -0.03889 -0.00202 -0.01402 -0.00191 
 (0.042) (0.005) (0.359) (0.366) (0.807) (0.587) 
AGE -0.00113 -0.00001 -0.00093 -0.00003 -0.00083 -0.00004 
 (0.553) (0.918) (0.405) (0.388) (0.631) (0.460) 
TREND 0.02976 0.00324*** -0.00586 -0.00026 0.01103 0.00055 
 (0.187) (0.002) (0.467) (0.302) (0.527) (0.352) 
BD_SIZE 0.00876 0.00139 -0.00012 0.00008 -0.00870 0.00009 
 (0.651) (0.159) (0.991) (0.797) (0.633) (0.880) 
IMPORT -0.39956** -0.02561*** 0.06656 0.00094 -0.34565** -0.00849** 
 (0.045) (0.005) (0.557) (0.751) (0.024) (0.035) 
       
OBSERVATIONS 893 893 3,673 3,673 821 821 
AIC -4.329 -3.380 -5.076 -4.856 -4.911 -4.652 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
DA is the performance adjusted positive discretionary accruals.  
STD_DA is the standard deviation of the residuals from equation (4).  
Columns 1 and 2: Positive Discretionary Accruals (DA);  
Columns 3 and 4: Accrual Quality (modified Dechow and Dichev)(STD_DA)(all companies);  
Columns 5 and 6: Accrual Quality (subsample of companies with positive DA).  
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Table 13: Test 4 – Real earnings management measures – OLS only 
________________________________________________________________________________
REMit = βo + β1ACCHD1it + β2ACCHD2it + β3ACCHD3it + β4SIZEit + β4CFOit + β6LEVERAGEit + 
β7BIG_Nit + β8DUALITYit + β9ALTMANit + β10SALE_GROWTHit + β11AGEit + β12TRENDit + 
β13BD_SIZEit  + β14IMPORTit + εit 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Abnormal cash flow 
from operation 
Abnormal production 
costs 
Abnormal discretionary 
expenditures 
    
CONSTANT 0.00733 -0.12077*** 0.16407*** 
 (0.733) (0.004) (0.003) 
ACCHD1 0.00052 -0.00891 -0.00081 
 (0.920) (0.369) (0.947) 
ACCHD2 -0.00220 -0.00336 0.00080 
 (0.602) (0.727) (0.944) 
ACCHD3 -0.00578 0.00001 0.00020 
 (0.303) (1.000) (0.987) 
SIZE 0.00664*** 0.01842*** -0.03393*** 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.000) 
CFO 0.38777*** -0.74982*** 0.30677*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) 
LEVERAGE -0.07682*** 0.04673 0.00382 
 (0.000) (0.171) (0.912) 
BIG_N 0.00576 0.05703** -0.05094 
 (0.654) (0.025) (0.107) 
DUALITY -0.00391 -0.00899 0.00045 
 (0.358) (0.385) (0.969) 
ALTMAN -0.00837*** 0.01236** -0.01218** 
 (0.006) (0.011) (0.030) 
SALE_GROWTH -0.01994*** 0.05023*** 0.01653 
 (0.008) (0.002) (0.360) 
AGE -0.00018 0.00016 -0.00022 
 (0.146) (0.622) (0.556) 
TREND -0.00351*** 0.00274 0.00809*** 
 (0.000) (0.106) (0.000) 
BD_SIZE -0.00095 -0.00786** 0.00906* 
 (0.466) (0.030) (0.053) 
IMPORT -0.03578*** 0.03751 0.02837 
 (0.008) (0.248) (0.478) 
DA -0.45565*** -0.01086 0.14330 
 (0.000) (0.894) (0.186) 
    
OBSERVATIONS 3,946 3,946 3,946 
AIC -2.157 -0.556 -0.222 
*** p<0.01,** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
The dependent variable is one of three real earnings management measures.  
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Table 14: Test 5 – The association between audit committee chair changes and positive 
discretionary accruals across different length of auditor tenure, using auditor tenure 
categories as defined in Davis et al. (2009) 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
DAit = βo + β1ACCHD1it + β2SHORT_Dit + β3LONG_Dit + β4ACCHD1*SHORT_Dit + β5ACCHD1*LONG_Dit + 
β6SIZEit + β7CFOit + β8LEVERAGEit + β9BIG_Nit + β10DUALITYit + β11ALTMANit + β12SALE_GROWTHit + 
β13AGEit + β14TRENDit + β15BD_SIZEit  + β16IMPORTit + εit 
 (1) (1) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Gamma  
distribution 
Gamma 
distribution 
OLS OLS 
     
CONSTANT -2.589442*** -2.623473*** 0.054294*** 0.053269*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ACCHD1  0.28607**  0.01204 
  (0.020)  (0.119) 
SHORT_D 0.307317** 0.337964*** 0.010001 0.010270 
 (0.014) (0.010) (0.171) (0.178) 
LONG_D 0.023596 0.041637 -0.000374 0.000140 
 (0.745) (0.578) (0.917) (0.970) 
ACCHD1*SHORT_D  -0.219231  -0.000831 
  (0.436)  (0.972) 
ACCHD1*LONG_D  -0.135470  -0.004751 
  (0.481)  (0.646) 
SIZE -0.114377*** -0.115678*** -0.002762 -0.002872 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.125) (0.110) 
CFO -3.241196*** -3.246002*** -0.387120*** -0.387344*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LEVERAGE 0.402910** 0.385142** 0.023117*** 0.022789*** 
 (0.018) (0.022) (0.009) (0.009) 
BIG_N 0.003045 0.017505 -0.005835 -0.005362 
 (0.983) (0.901) (0.476) (0.507) 
DUALITY -0.021737 -0.011002 -0.000590 -0.000419 
 (0.772) (0.884) (0.860) (0.900) 
ALTMAN 0.009719 0.009551 0.001720 0.001707 
 (0.765) (0.769) (0.252) (0.256) 
SALE_GROWTH 0.159175** 0.156711** 0.018546*** 0.018239*** 
 (0.030) (0.033) (0.005) (0.005) 
AGE -0.000885 -0.000987 0.000006 0.000006 
 (0.657) (0.617) (0.951) (0.951) 
TREND 0.031073 0.029787 0.003395*** 0.003373*** 
 (0.166) (0.185) (0.001) (0.001) 
BD_SIZE 0.009819 0.010994 0.001443 0.001492 
 (0.614) (0.568) (0.145) (0.126) 
IMPORT -0.389348* -0.385123* -0.026316*** -0.025775*** 
 (0.055) (0.053) (0.005) (0.005) 
     
OBSERVATIONS 893 893 893 893 
AIC -4.330 -4.327 -3.378 -3.376 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
DA is performance adjusted positive discretionary accruals. Refer to Table 1 for variable definitions. 
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Table 15: Test 5 – The association between audit committee chair changes and positive 
discretionary accruals across different length of auditor tenure, using auditor tenure 
categories as defined in the August 2011 PCAOB concept release 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
DAit = βo + β1ACCHD1it + β2SHORT_Pit + β3ACCHD1*SHORT_Pit + β4SIZEit + β5CFOit + β6LEVERAGEit + 
β7BIG_Nit + β8DUALITYit + β9ALTMANit + β10SALE_GROWTHit + β11AGEit + β12TRENDit + β13BD_SIZEit  + 
β14IMPORTit + εit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Gamma 
distribution 
Gamma 
distribution 
OLS OLS 
     
CONSTANT -2.656917*** -2.674737*** 0.049202*** 0.048686*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
ACCHD1  0.247884*  0.010056 
  (0.052)  (0.163) 
SHORT_P 0.145290** 0.153158** 0.009312** 0.009284** 
 (0.046) (0.047) (0.011) (0.013) 
ACCHD1*SHORT_P  -0.093414  -0.000719 
  (0.620)  (0.946) 
SIZE -0.113900*** -0.115022*** -0.003002* -0.003098* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.092) (0.082) 
CFO -3.274999*** -3.280248*** -0.385691*** -0.385845*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LEVERAGE 0.386364** 0.373642** 0.022948*** 0.022729*** 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.008) (0.008) 
BIG_N -0.011907 0.001769 -0.004742 -0.004399 
 (0.929) (0.989) (0.552) (0.574) 
DUALITY -0.049782 -0.043576 -0.001316 -0.001193 
 (0.506) (0.564) (0.693) (0.719) 
ALTMAN 0.011401 0.011870 0.001659 0.001643 
 (0.709) (0.696) (0.262) (0.267) 
SALE_GROWTH 0.159246** 0.156038** 0.018622*** 0.018306*** 
 (0.033) (0.038) (0.004) (0.005) 
AGE 0.000185 0.000206 0.000051 0.000052 
 (0.927) (0.919) (0.599) (0.590) 
TREND 0.035903 0.035009 0.003539*** 0.003528*** 
 (0.112) (0.121) (0.001) (0.001) 
BD_SIZE 0.012681 0.012166 0.001583 0.001598 
 (0.517) (0.532) (0.109) (0.105) 
IMPORT -0.387891* -0.381942* -0.024478*** -0.023917*** 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.008) (0.008) 
     
OBSERVATIONS 893 893 893 893 
AIC -4.331 -4.331 -3.387 -3.387 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
DA is the performance adjusted positive discretionary accruals. Refer to Table 1 for variable definitions. 
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Table 16: Test 5 – The association between audit committee chair changes and real earnings 
management measures across different length of auditor tenure, using auditor tenure 
categories as defined in Davis et al. (2009) and PCAOB (2011) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Abnormal cash 
flow from 
operation 
Abnormal 
production 
costs 
Abnormal 
discretionary 
expenditures 
Abnormal 
cash flow 
from 
operation 
Abnormal 
production 
costs 
Abnormal 
discretionary 
expenditures 
       
CONSTANT 0.0115 -0.1260*** 0.1622*** 0.0137 -0.1256*** 0.1609*** 
 (0.569) (0.003) (0.003) (0.528) (0.004) (0.004) 
ACCHD1 0.0051 -0.0077 -0.0102 0.0064 -0.0210* 0.0031 
 (0.346) (0.523) (0.516) (0.321) (0.078) (0.833) 
SHORT_D -0.0002 0.0128 -0.0098    
 (0.977) (0.473) (0.671)    
LONG_D 0.0011 0.0032 -0.0064    
 (0.804) (0.779) (0.608)    
ACCHD1_SHORT_D -0.0858** 0.0003 0.1281*    
 (0.049) (0.997) (0.070)    
ACCHD1_LONG_D 0.0005 -0.0017 0.0067    
 (0.955) (0.924) (0.770)    
SHORT_P    -0.0051 0.0021 0.0039 
    (0.229) (0.847) (0.760) 
ACCHD1_SHORT_P    -0.0132 0.0313* -0.0099 
    (0.190) (0.085) (0.670) 
SIZE 0.0068*** 0.0185*** -0.0341*** 0.0067*** 0.0184*** -0.0340*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.000) (0.004) (0.002) (0.000) 
CFO 0.3870*** -0.7490*** 0.3084*** 0.3901*** -0.7521*** 0.3067*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) 
LEVERAGE -0.0769*** 0.0470 0.0035 -0.0765*** 0.0460 0.0038 
 (0.000) (0.167) (0.919) (0.000) (0.178) (0.913) 
BIG_N 0.0018 0.0602** -0.0473 0.0032 0.0590** -0.0499 
 (0.869) (0.018) (0.129) (0.798) (0.021) (0.115) 
DUALITY -0.0040 -0.0089 0.0006 -0.0037 -0.0090 0.0003 
 (0.346) (0.388) (0.962) (0.384) (0.386) (0.983) 
ALTMAN -0.0084*** 0.0124** -0.0122** -0.0084*** 0.0124** -0.0121** 
 (0.006) (0.010) (0.030) (0.006) (0.010) (0.031) 
SALE_GROWTH -0.0199*** 0.0504*** 0.0161 -0.0200*** 0.0504*** 0.0164 
 (0.008) (0.002) (0.371) (0.008) (0.002) (0.363) 
AGE -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002* 0.0002 -0.0002 
 (0.111) (0.686) (0.662) (0.083) (0.588) (0.581) 
TREND -0.0037*** 0.0027 0.0081*** -0.0038*** 0.0029* 0.0082*** 
 (0.000) (0.105) (0.000) (0.000) (0.088) (0.000) 
BD_SIZE -0.0011 -0.0079** 0.0093** -0.0011 -0.0077** 0.0091* 
 (0.392) (0.029) (0.047) (0.382) (0.033) (0.052) 
IMPORT -0.0354*** 0.0377 0.0281 -0.0361*** 0.0383 0.0284 
 (0.008) (0.246) (0.481) (0.008) (0.237) (0.476) 
DA -0.4571*** -0.0102 0.1460 -0.4549*** -0.0129 0.1443 
 (0.000) (0.900) (0.173) (0.000) (0.874) (0.182) 
       
       
OBSERVATIONS 3,946 3,946 3,946 3,946 3,946 3,946 
AIC -2.161 -0.555 -0.222 -2.159 -0.556 -0.222 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The dependent variable is one of three real earnings management measures as described in Section III. All variables are 
as defined in Table 1. 
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Table 17: Test 5 – The association between audit committee chair changes and the standard 
deviation of abnormal accruals (accrual quality) across different length of auditor tenure, 
using auditor tenure categories as defined in Davis et al. (2009) 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
STD_DAit = βo + β1ACCHD2it + β2SHORT_Dit + β3LONG_Dit + β4ACCHD2*SHORT_Dit + β5ACCHD2*LONG_Dit + 
β6SIZEit + β7CFOit + β8LEVERAGEit + β9BIG_Nit + β10DUALITYit + β11ALTMANit + β12SALE_GROWTHit + 
β13AGEit + β14TRENDit +  β15BD_SIZEit  + β16IMPORTit + εit 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Gamma  
distribution 
Gamma 
distribution 
OLS OLS 
     
CONSTANT 
-2.50515*** -2.50816*** 0.06487*** 0.06480*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ACCHD2 
 -0.02085  -0.00030 
 
 (0.653)  (0.848) 
SHORT_D 0.12443* 0.10787 0.00364 0.00316 
 (0.082) (0.129) (0.194) (0.261) 
LONG_D 
-0.04982 -0.04004 -0.00160 -0.00132 
 (0.258) (0.377) (0.231) (0.340) 
ACCHD2*SHORT_D 
 0.19668  0.00604 
 
 (0.308)  (0.434) 
ACCHD2*LONG_D 
 -0.09344  -0.00255 
 
 (0.149)  (0.193) 
SIZE 
-0.14673*** -0.14630*** -0.00444*** -0.00443*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CFO 
-0.19954 -0.20884 -0.00959 -0.00974 
 (0.292) (0.266) (0.264) (0.255) 
LEVERAGE 0.26142*** 0.26292*** 0.00745*** 0.00751*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.007) 
BIG_N 
-0.03071 -0.03165 -0.00414 -0.00420 
 (0.782) (0.775) (0.376) (0.369) 
DUALITY 0.00811 0.00726 -0.00014 -0.00016 
 (0.818) (0.835) (0.892) (0.881) 
ALTMAN 0.00548 0.00619 0.00005 0.00007 
 (0.648) (0.606) (0.908) (0.878) 
SALE_GROWTH 
-0.03884 -0.03595 -0.00211 -0.00202 
 (0.365) (0.402) (0.350) (0.371) 
AGE 
-0.00064 -0.00062 -0.00002 -0.00002 
 (0.595) (0.606) (0.618) (0.635) 
TREND 
-0.00541 -0.00470 -0.00024 -0.00023 
 (0.502) (0.560) (0.335) (0.349) 
BD_SIZE 0.00056 0.00045 0.00011 0.00011 
 (0.960) (0.968) (0.734) (0.731) 
IMPORT 0.07071 0.06964 0.00102 0.00098 
 (0.530) (0.538) (0.730) (0.741) 
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Table 17 (continued)     
     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Gamma  
distribution 
Gamma 
distribution 
OLS OLS 
     
Observations 3,673 3,673 3,673 3,673 
AIC -5.077 -5.076 -4.859 -4.858 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
STD_DA is the standard deviation of the residuals from equation (4). Refer to Table 1 for variable defintions. 
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Table 18: Test 5 – The association between audit committee chair changes and the standard 
deviation of discretionary accruals (accrual quality) across different length of auditor tenure, 
using auditor tenure categories as defined in the August 2011 PCAOB concept release 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
STD_DAit = βo + β1ACCHD2it + β2SHORT_Pit + β3ACCHD2*SHORT_Pit + β4SIZEit + β5CFOit + β6LEVERAGEit + 
β7BIG_Nit + β8DUALITYit + β9ALTMANit + β10SALE_GROWTHit + β11AGEit + β12TRENDit + β13BD_SIZEit  + 
β14IMPORTit + εit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Gamma 
distribution 
Gamma 
distribution 
OLS OLS 
     
Constant -2.52392*** -2.51745*** 0.06411*** 0.06435*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ACCHD2  -0.11645***  -0.00301*** 
  (0.003)  (0.005) 
SHORT_P 0.08090* 0.06626 0.00260** 0.00215 
 (0.054) (0.127) (0.047) (0.114) 
ACCHD2*SHORT_P  0.15499**  0.00470** 
  (0.021)  (0.033) 
SIZE -0.14690*** -0.14680*** -0.00445*** -0.00445*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CFO -0.20705 -0.21114 -0.01020 -0.01025 
 (0.274) (0.262) (0.234) (0.231) 
LEVERAGE 0.25957*** 0.26193*** 0.00736*** 0.00740*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.008) 
BIG_N -0.05386 -0.05240 -0.00479 -0.00479 
 (0.616) (0.624) (0.287) (0.287) 
DUALITY 0.00554 0.00599 -0.00023 -0.00022 
 (0.874) (0.863) (0.823) (0.835) 
ALTMAN 0.00455 0.00460 0.00004 0.00003 
 (0.699) (0.696) (0.930) (0.938) 
SALE_GROWTH -0.03911 -0.03609 -0.00206 -0.00197 
 (0.369) (0.403) (0.359) (0.381) 
AGE -0.00066 -0.00062 -0.00002 -0.00002 
 (0.558) (0.583) (0.538) (0.564) 
TREND -0.00570 -0.00489 -0.00025 -0.00023 
 (0.473) (0.537) (0.320) (0.351) 
BD_SIZE 0.00054 0.00036 0.00012 0.00012 
 (0.962) (0.974) (0.702) (0.702) 
IMPORT 0.07327 0.07242 0.00115 0.00110 
 (0.514) (0.521) (0.697) (0.711) 
     
Observations 3,673 3,673 3,673 3,673 
AIC -5.078 -5.078 -4.860 -4.860 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
STD_DA is the standard deviation of the residuals from equation (4).  
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Table 19: TEST 6 – Audit committee chair changes and the collaborative tenure of CEO and 
the auditor – positive discretionary accruals analysis 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
DAit = βo + β1ACCHD1it + β2AUD_TENit + β3CEO_TENit + β4MIN_CEO_AUDit (CEO*AUDit) + 
β5ACCHD1*CEO_TENit + β6ACCHD1*AUD_TENit + β7ACCHD1*MIN_CEO_AUDit (ACCHD1*CEO*AUDit) + 
β8SIZEit + β9CFOit + β10LEVERAGEit + β11BIG_Nit + β12DUALITYit + β13ALTMANit + β14SALE_GROWTHit + 
β15AGEit + β16TRENDit + β17BD_SIZEit  + β18IMPORTit + εit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Gamma  
distribution 
Gamma 
distribution 
OLS OLS 
     
CONSTANT -2.4839*** -2.5860*** 0.0573*** 0.051454*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ACCHD1 0.3577* -0.0717 0.0163 0.002709 
 (0.051) (0.762) (0.117) (0.836) 
AUD_TEN 0.0006 0.0049 -0.0001 0.000200 
 (0.884) (0.319) (0.763) (0.398) 
CEO_TEN 0.0127** 0.0150** 0.0006** 0.000830*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.044) (0.007) 
MIN_CEO_AUD -0.0312***  -0.0011***  
 (0.000)  (0.009)  
ACCHD1*AUD_TEN 0.0037 0.0199 0.0003 0.000805 
 (0.675) (0.140) (0.495) (0.219) 
ACCHD1*CEO_TEN 0.0196 0.0502 0.0004 0.001321 
 (0.203) (0.128) (0.596) (0.379) 
ACCHD1*MIN_CEO_AUD -0.0690**  -0.0026  
 (0.033)  (0.103)  
CEO*AUD  -0.0011***  -0.000053*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002) 
ACCHD1*CEO*AUD  -0.0037*  -0.000130 
  (0.075)  (0.134) 
SIZE -0.1302*** -0.1251*** -0.0033* -0.003219* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.067) (0.067) 
CFO -3.2778*** -3.2628*** -0.3867*** -0.388202*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LEVERAGE 0.3626** 0.3475** 0.0221** 0.022149** 
 (0.025) (0.035) (0.011) (0.011) 
BIG_N 0.0383 0.0013 -0.0045 -0.005540 
 (0.770) (0.992) (0.565) (0.486) 
DUALITY 0.0126 -0.0235 0.0005 -0.000471 
 (0.870) (0.760) (0.875) (0.894) 
ALTMAN 0.0109 0.0058 0.0017 0.001648 
 (0.734) (0.863) (0.261) (0.274) 
SALE_GROWTH 0.1382* 0.1439** 0.0180*** 0.017792*** 
 (0.050) (0.044) (0.006) (0.006) 
AGE -0.0006 0.0000 0.0000 0.000053 
 (0.782) (0.985) (0.825) (0.626) 
TREND 0.0408* 0.0402* 0.0036*** 0.003662*** 
 (0.070) (0.076) (0.001) (0.000) 
BD_SIZE 0.0132 0.0105 0.0016 0.001531 
 (0.498) (0.587) (0.107) (0.122) 
IMPORT -0.3669* -0.4073** -0.0249*** -0.026639*** 
 (0.070) (0.043) (0.006) (0.003) 
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Table 19 (continued)     
     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Gamma  
distribution 
Gamma 
distribution 
OLS OLS 
     
OBSERVATIONS 893 893 893 893 
AIC -4.329 -4.332 -4.331 -4.331 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
DA is the performance adjusted positive discretionary accruals. Refer to Table 1 for variable definitions. 
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Table 20: TEST 6 – Audit committee chair changes and the collaborative tenure of CEO and 
the auditor – real earnings management analysis 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
REMit = βo + β1ACCHD1it + β2AUD_TENit + β3CEO_TENit + β4MIN_CEO_AUDit + β5ACCHD1*CEO_TENit + 
β6ACCHD1*AUD_TENit + β7ACCHD1*MIN_CEO_AUDit + β8SIZEit + β9CFOit + β10LEVERAGEit + β11BIG_Nit + 
β12DUALITYit + β13ALTMANit + β14SALE_GROWTHit + β15AGEit + β16TRENDit + β17BD_SIZEit + β18IMPORTit + εit 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Abnormal cash flow from 
operation 
Abnormal 
production costs 
Abnormal discretionary 
expenditures 
    
CONSTANT 0.0086 -0.1210*** 0.1594*** 
 (0.695) (0.004) (0.004) 
ACCHD1 -0.0040 -0.0010 0.0010 
 (0.711) (0.958) (0.968) 
AUD_TEN 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0002 
 (0.446) (0.630) (0.782) 
CEO_TEN 0.0003 -0.0008 0.0008 
 (0.462) (0.425) (0.456) 
MIN_CEO_AUD -0.0006 0.0013 -0.0008 
 (0.379) (0.402) (0.633) 
ACCHD1*AUD_TEN 0.0003 -0.0005 0.0004 
 (0.517) (0.580) (0.687) 
ACCHD1*CEO_TEN -0.0014 0.0036 -0.0033 
 (0.167) (0.121) (0.218) 
ACCHD1*MIN_CEO_AUD 0.0019 -0.0045 0.0027 
 (0.249) (0.235) (0.521) 
SIZE 0.0066*** 0.0185*** -0.0340*** 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.000) 
CFO 0.3882*** -0.7493*** 0.3062*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) 
LEVERAGE -0.0769*** 0.0463 0.0047 
 (0.000) (0.175) (0.893) 
BIG_N 0.0055 0.0562** -0.0493 
 (0.668) (0.026) (0.117) 
DUALITY -0.0036 -0.0090 -0.0006 
 (0.413) (0.412) (0.963) 
ALTMAN -0.0084*** 0.0124** -0.0122** 
 (0.006) (0.010) (0.030) 
SALE_GROWTH -0.0196*** 0.0496*** 0.0169 
 (0.009) (0.002) (0.349) 
AGE -0.0002* 0.0002 -0.0003 
 (0.082) (0.508) (0.502) 
TREND -0.0036*** 0.0027 0.0081*** 
 (0.000) (0.112) (0.000) 
BD_SIZE -0.0011 -0.0076** 0.0090* 
 (0.385) (0.036) (0.058) 
IMPORT -0.0359*** 0.0384 0.0278 
 (0.008) (0.236) (0.486) 
DA -0.4552*** -0.0110 0.1424 
 (0.000) (0.893) (0.189) 
    
OBSERVATIONS 3,946 3,946 3,946 
AIC -2.156 -0.555 -0.220 
*** p<0.01,** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The dependent variable is one of three real earnings management measures. 
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Table 21: TEST 6 – Audit committee chair changes and the collaborative tenure of CEO and 
the auditor – accrual quality analysis 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
STD_DAit = βo + β1ACCHD2it + β2AUD_TENit + β3CEO_TENit + β4MIN_CEO_AUDit + β5ACCHD2*CEO_TENit + 
β6ACCHD2*AUD_TENit + β7ACCHD2*MIN_CEO_AUDit + β8SIZEit + β9CFOit + β10LEVERAGEit + β11BIG_Nit + 
β12DUALITYit + β13ALTMANit + β14SALE_GROWTHit + β15AGEit + β16TRENDit + β17BD_SIZEit + β18IMPORTit + εit 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Gamma distribution OLS 
   
   
CONSTANT -2.3780*** 0.0691*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
ACCHD2 -0.0110 -0.0006 
 (0.858) (0.763) 
AUD_TEN -0.0039 -0.0001* 
 (0.141) (0.098) 
CEO_TEN -0.0058 -0.0002 
 (0.157) (0.103) 
MIN_CEO_AUD -0.0002 0.0000 
 (0.972) (0.873) 
ACCHD2_AUD_TEN -0.0063** -0.0001* 
 (0.028) (0.099) 
ACCHD2_CEO_TEN 0.0108 0.0004 
 (0.209) (0.180) 
ACCHD2_MIN_CEO_AUD -0.0042 -0.0003 
 (0.757) (0.505) 
SIZE -0.1474*** -0.0045*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
CFO -0.2172 -0.0102 
 (0.241) (0.231) 
LEVERAGE 0.2481*** 0.0070** 
 (0.004) (0.012) 
BIG_N -0.0659 -0.0052 
 (0.542) (0.248) 
DUALITY 0.0307 0.0006 
 (0.400) (0.603) 
ALTMAN 0.0054 0.0001 
 (0.645) (0.904) 
SALE_GROWTH -0.0331 -0.0020 
 (0.436) (0.384) 
AGE -0.0001 -0.0000 
 (0.956) (1.000) 
TREND -0.0041 -0.0002 
 (0.605) (0.380) 
BD_SIZE -0.0008 0.0001 
 (0.946) (0.863) 
IMPORT 0.0746 0.0012 
 (0.505) (0.680) 
   
OBSERVATIONS 3,673 3,673 
AIC -5.077 -4.861 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
STD_DA is the standard deviation of the residuals from equation (4). Refer to Table 1 for variable definitions. 
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